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Abstract: Every day, in courthouses across America, numerous domestic violence
protection order cases are dismissed for lack of personal service, even though law enforcement
is tasked under federal law with effectuating service. Service of process presents substantial
access to justice and access to safety issues for domestic violence survivors who seek legal
protection, as nearly 40% of petitioners for civil protection orders are unable to achieve
personal service on those against whom they seek protection. Research shows that the civil
protection order remedy is the most effective legal means for intervening in and eliminating
abuse, yet petitioners who fail to achieve personal service—whether because respondents
evade service or are impossible to locate yet continue threats and abuse—are left without
vitally needed protection. Procedural rules operate to inhibit the legal remedy’s effectiveness
and create a two-stage dilemma by: (1) often requiring notice prior to the temporary protection
order stage, which can create danger pre-hearing, and (2) requiring personal service for a full
protection order when danger may still exist and the respondent may successfully evade
service.
In stark contrast, other areas of the law—including antitrust, bankruptcy, domestic and
international business, eviction, divorce, and termination of parental rights—readily permit
alternative service methods. In seeking to understand the law’s differential treatment of
domestic violence, this Article explores the historic origins of the heightened notice and service
requirements for domestic violence remedies and the ongoing race, class, and gender
implications, including as displayed by the #MeToo movement. In proposing expanded service
methods that satisfy due process rights and address procedural justice, the Article examines
both the respondent’s interests and the petitioner’s constitutionally protected right to a hearing
on the merits, which is not normally acknowledged. States need not wait for tragedy before
making the protection order remedy more accessible, as has been the pattern for several states
that have adopted alternative service means for domestic violence remedies.
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INTRODUCTION
Barbara came to my domestic violence clinic in Orange County,
California, after learning that her boyfriend had committed horrific acts
of sexual abuse against her eight-year-old daughter from a prior
relationship.1 He fled when Barbara discovered his abuse and called the
police, but Barbara and her daughters live in fear of his return. We
received judicial permission to serve via publication a termination of
parental rights case concerning the younger child they had in common,2
but, at the time,3 California law required personal service for domestic
violence civil protection orders, which we were unable to achieve.
Heightened procedural requirements for domestic violence remedies
impeded the effectiveness of this safety remedy and left Barbara and her
daughters without needed court protection.
Over one thousand miles away in Seattle, before Rebecca Jane Griego
was murdered at age twenty-six by her ex-boyfriend, Jonathan Rowan,
she sought a domestic violence protection order.4 She detailed in her court
pleadings her inability to personally serve Jonathan despite his continued
threats, writing, “[Jonathan] called me to tell me I cannot find him but he
can find me . . . and to look over my shoulder because I would see him

1. Clients have given permission to share the details contained within this Article and their names
and identifying information have been changed to protect confidentiality.
2. Court pleadings and orders are on file with the Author.
3. On behalf of Barbara and multiple other clients, the domestic violence clinic that I direct at the
University of California, Irvine School of Law sought legislative reform to permit alternative service
for domestic violence civil restraining orders. See Assemb. B. 2694, 2017–18 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal.
2018). Effective January 1, 2019, petitioners can seek judicial permission for service by publication,
mail, or other methods upon showing diligent efforts at personal service and that the respondent
appears to be evading service. Act of Aug. 27, 2018, ch. 219, sec. 3, § 6340(2), 2018 Cal. Stat. 2498
(codified at CAL. FAM. CODE § 6340(2) (West 2018)). Electronic service is not explicitly available,
and petitioners bear the responsibility to motion for alternative service, issues that are explored in
Parts II and V, infra.
4. Jim Brunner & Nick Perry, Months of Stalking End with Two Dead at UW, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr.
3, 2007, 7:18 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/months-of-stalking-end-with-2-deadat-uw/ [https://perma.cc/7YJY-535K].
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again.”5 Tragically, two weeks later Jonathan came to Rebecca’s office at
the University of Washington and fatally shot her before killing himself.6
Following her daughter’s death, Rebecca’s mother recalled how in the
weeks before Jonathan murdered her daughter, Rebecca “felt a crippling
fear as she and her sister tried time and again to track down [the] abusive
ex-boyfriend and serve him legal papers.”7
Given the life-threatening nature8 of domestic violence,9 many abuse
survivors seek court protection from further abuse in the form of civil
protection orders.10 The moment of separation from an abusive partner
and the ensuing period when seeking to remain free from abuse are now
known to be times of heightened danger and lethality.11 During this period
of acute danger, when survivors of abuse and stalking are most in need of
legal protection, it may be denied because of victims’ inability to
personally serve abusive partners.
Personal service—or in-hand delivery of a summons to the opposing
party by a person authorized by law—is required for domestic violence

5. Id.
6. Id.; Seattle Times Staff, UW Staffer Killed by Stalker, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 2, 2007, 10:46 PM),
http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/uw-staffer-killed-by-stalker/ [https://perma.cc/38PM-NX2W].
7. Nick Perry, Family of UW Worker Seeks New Law, SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 21, 2008, 12:34 AM),
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/family-of-uw-worker-seeks-new-law/
[https://perma.cc/JKH7-KR8N].
8. SHANNAN CATALANO, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE: ATTRIBUTES OF
VICTIMIZATION, 1993–2011, at 3 (2013), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ipvav9311.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KV9V-K7V5] (analyzing homicide data and concluding that women are more likely
to be killed by an intimate partner than by any other person known or unknown to them); Susan
Sorenson & Douglas Wiebe, Weapons in the Lives of Battered Women, 94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1412,
1412–16 (2004) (“Firearms are more common in the households of battered women and their partners
than among the general population, which is cause for concern, given the lethality of firearms.”). In
two-thirds of these households, the intimate partner used the gun(s) against the woman, usually
threatening to shoot/kill her (71.4%) or to shoot at her (5.1%). Id. at 1414.
9. Domestic violence may consist of physical or verbal force, sexual abuse, acts of coercion or
intimidation, the denial of access to resources, deprivation of liberty, or life-threatening situations that
result in psychological or physical harm and subordinate the abused partner. See EVAN STARK,
COERCIVE CONTROL 85–87 (Claire Renzetti & Jeffrey L. Edleson eds., 2007) (discussing the need to
broaden definitions of domestic violence beyond physical abuse to include psychological, emotional,
and other tactics and harms).
10. Sally F. Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil Protection Orders for Domestic Violence: Can Law Help
End the Abuse Without Ending the Relationship?, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1487, 1489 (2008) (citing
civil protection orders as the “most commonly used legal remedy for domestic violence”). Note that
different jurisdictions use the terms civil protection order, protective order, restraining order, domestic
violence order, order for protection, order of protection, or peace bond to refer to the same civil legal
remedy regarding intimate partners and family members. For clarity, this Article uses the term “civil
protection order.”
11. Jacquelyn C. Campbell et al., Risk Factors for Femicide in Abusive Relationships: Results from
a Multisite Case Control Study, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1089, 1091 (2003).
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civil protection orders in most jurisdictions.12 Although the Violence
Against Women Act (VAWA)13 prohibits states from charging petitioners
for service of process in domestic violence cases, and states require law
enforcement agencies to serve protection order petitions and court orders
on respondents without charging fees to petitioners,14 many respondents
in domestic violence cases purposefully and successfully evade service.15
For example, a recent study in Seattle determined that police were unable
to accomplish service in more than 40% of protection order cases due to
their inability to locate the subject.16 On any given day in courthouses
across America, more than one-third of domestic violence civil protection
order cases are continued or dismissed for lack of personal service.17
Department of Justice statistics further show that approximately one-third
of issued civil protection orders are not personally served as required in

12. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 243 (West 2018) (requiring personal service for protection orders);
LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1261(b) (2019) (only permitting alternative service on corporations);
infra note 150 and accompanying text.
13. 34 U.S.C. §§ 10450, 10461 (2018).
14. Id. (requiring jurisdictions to certify that their laws and the practices of their courts and law
enforcement agencies do not make domestic violence victims pay costs associated with the “filing,
issuance, registration, modification, enforcement, dismissal, or service of a warrant, protection order,
petition for a protection order, or witness subpoena”). The prohibition on charging fees is based on
compliance requirements of the VAWA Services Training Officers Prosecutors (STOP) Violence
Against Women Formula Grants and the VAWA Community Defined Solutions to Violence Against
Women (CDS) (formerly entitled Grants to Encourage Arrest Policies and Enforcement of Protection
Orders). Currently, all states, territories, and some tribes receive STOP grants, and many communities
and tribes receive CDS funds. SARAH HENRY & MONICA N. PLAYER, NAT’L CTR. ON PROT. ORDERS &
FULL FAITH & CREDIT, VAWA PROHIBITION ON FEES FOR SERVICE OF PROTECTION ORDERS:
IMPLICATIONS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (2011), http://www.bwjp.org/assets/documents/pdfs/
vawa_prohibition_on_fees_for_service_of_protection_orders.pdf [https://perma.cc/KQ8H-TR8A].
15. The author has numerous case examples on file. See also Restraining Order Dismissed for Lack
of
Service,
LIEBER & GALPERIN LLP,
http://losangelesrestrainingorderattorney.com
/uncategorized/restraining-order-dimissed/ [https://perma.cc/D2GR-JRCS] (reporting that Kenya
Moore, the Real Housewives of Atlanta reality television star, was forced to dismiss her civil restraining
order case against her ex-boyfriend, Matt Jordan, because she could not serve him, although Jordan was
calling Moore approximately thirty times per day and threatened her after she blocked his phone number).
16. Rebecca Griego Bill Passes Senate Unanimously, U.S. ST. NEWS (Feb. 12, 2008); see also
Natalie Singer, Legal Delays Add to Victims’ Fears, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 6, 2007, 2:02 AM),
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/legal-delays-add-to-victims-fears/
[https://perma.cc/
Z8CL-2E9Z] (reporting that in Seattle in 2006, only 58% of the 1,076 domestic violence temporary
protection orders (TPO) sent to the police department for service were successfully served).
17. Singer, supra note 16; see also SURVIVORS & ADVOCATES FOR EMPOWERMENT (DC SAFE),
INC., DC DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURT WATCH PROJECT: 2012 REPORT 29 (2013),
https://courtwatchdc.files.wordpress.com/2013/08/2012courtwatchreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/SH
3D-AC2F] (identifying that in the District of Columbia in 2012, 34% of cases were continued for lack
of personal service and 12% of cases were dismissed for lack of service).
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domestic violence cases; in contrast, only 4% of criminal restraining
orders remain unserved.18 Whether abusers intentionally evade service or
are otherwise unable to be located for personal service, these service
requirements impede access to safety and justice for many abuse
survivors.19
Between 1976 and 1993, all fifty states and the District of Columbia
enacted domestic violence civil protection order statutes.20 States must
now ensure that petitioners have procedural access to hearings for these
state-created remedies.21 Rather than defaulting to the broader state civil
procedure codes, civil protection order remedies often have more stringent
procedural rules imposed through family code provisions22 or under
procedural rules governing domestic violence courts.23 Such heightened
procedural requirements operate to decrease the legal remedy’s
effectiveness by making such protection inaccessible to many victims, as
shown by Rebecca and Barbara’s experiences.
The current personal service requirement in domestic violence
protection order cases stands in stark contrast to the alternative means of
service permitted in many other areas of the law. Alternative service

18. Monica Rhor, Orders Often Fail to Restrain Violence, ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Mar. 18, 2006,
3:00 AM), https://www.ocregister.com/2006/03/18/orders-often-fail-to-restrain-violence/ [https://per
ma.cc/WKR8-HCAB] (additionally reporting that over 40,000 California civil and criminal domestic
violence protection orders were not served as of 2006).
19. EMILIE MEYER, NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES, CIVIL PROTECTION
ORDERS: A GUIDE FOR IMPROVING PRACTICE 4 (2010), https://www.ncjfcj.org/sites/
default/files/cpo_guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/W7TC-RQTX] (noting that barriers to accessing
protection orders have gone unnoticed and unaddressed, and specifying that “the ability of the system
to protect victims can be impeded by barriers in both service and enforcement”).
20. Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the Roles of
Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3, 28–32 (1999) (discussing
the enactment of protection order remedies across the United States); Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E.
Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law,
21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 1070 (1993) (conducting a fifty-state survey concerning the recently
enacted remedy); Domestic Violence/Domestic Abuse Definitions and Relationships, NAT’L CONF.
ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 8, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/domestic-violencedomestic-abuse-definitions-and-relationships.aspx [https://perma.cc/GB3C-GNMT] (mapping state
laws regarding domestic violence or abuse and definitions of qualifying relationships and conduct
that constitutes abuse).
21. Infra note 37 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 243 (West 2018) (requiring personal service for domestic violence cases).
23. See D.C. SUPER. CT. DOM. VIO. R. 5(a)(3); cf. D.C. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. PRO. 5 (identifying
multiple options for service, including leaving pleadings and summons with the clerk’s office if the
opposing party has no known address); Anderson v. Sherman, 178 Cal. Rptr. 38 (Ct. App. 1981)
(Where the petitioner can validly accomplish service of process under either the provisions of the
Code of Civil Procedure or an alternative statute, the requirements for service under a specific statute
prevail over the more general provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.).
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methods are explicitly permissible in business,24 eviction,25 bankruptcy,26
and criminal cases,27 in which liberty and financial interests are at stake.
Alternative means of service are also available in other legal realms
concerning intimate and familial relationships. For example, marriages
can be dissolved, child custody and support can be awarded, and parental
rights can be terminated following notice through publication in a
newspaper of general circulation or by posting notice at a designated
location.28 While articles from the past two decades discuss general trends
toward electronic service,29 and New York now allows electronic service

24. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 4; CAL. CORP. CODE § 15908.06 (Deering 2018) (publishing at least
once in a newspaper is sufficient for notice of dissolution of limited partnership); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 9, § 280 (West 2018) (providing that dissolution of corporations may be notified by publication);
LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1261(b) (West 2019) (permitting alternative service on corporations);
Snyder v. Alternate Energy Inc., 857 N.Y.S.2d 442, 446 (Civ. Ct. 2008) (holding that N.Y. C.P.L.R.
308 does not directly authorize service of process by email, but service by email is sufficient where
other modes are unavailable).
25. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1162, 1946 (West 2018) (providing alternative service
where personal service is unavailable, including leaving a copy with someone of suitable age and
discretion or affixing a copy in a conspicuous place on the property); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9211 (West 2018) (providing alternate service by leaving a copy to a person over the age of thirteen
years residing on the premises, or by sending a copy via certified or registered mail); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 32-31-1-9 (West 2018) (giving notice to any resident or affixing a copy of the notice to a
conspicuous part of the premises when the tenant is not present).
26. Jeanne Finegan, The Web Offers Near, Real-Time Cost-Efficient Notice, AM. BANKR. INST. J.,
June 2003, at 1–7.
27. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 4 (“A summons is served on an individual defendant . . . by leaving a copy
at the defendant’s residence or usual place of abode with a person of suitable age and discretion
residing at that location and by mailing a copy to the defendant’s last known address.”); ALA. R.
CRIM. P. 3.4 (authorizing service of summons in the same manner as civil service except for
publication, which includes the option of leaving a copy at the person’s abode); MASS. R. CRIM. P.
17 (“A summons shall be served upon a witness by delivering a copy to him personally, by leaving it
at his dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein, or by mailing to the witness’ last known address.”).
28. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 413.30 (“Where no provision is made in this chapter or other
law for the service of summons, the court in which the action is pending may direct that summons be
served in a manner which is reasonably calculated to give actual notice to the party to be served and
that proof of such service be made as prescribed by the court.”); CAL. FAM. CODE § 215 (West 2018)
(providing that a motion for modification of custody, visitation, or child support may be served by
mail); id. § 4724 (permitting service by certified mail or other means for child support delinquency);
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 294 (West 2018) (providing alternative service methods in dependent
child proceedings); id. § 366.26 (providing for service by mail to terminate parental rights or establish
guardianship of children adjudged dependent of the court); Application for Order for Publication or
Posting
(Family
Law),
CAL.
CTS.,
http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/fl980.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QDF9-3JY8] (court form for requesting notice through publication or posting).
29. See Jeremy A. Colby, You’ve Got Mail: The Modern Trend Towards Universal Electronic
Service of Process, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 337, 339 (2003); Frank Conley, Service with a Smiley: The
Effect of E-Mail and Other Electronic Communications on Service of Process, 11 TEMP. INT’L &
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for divorce,30 alternative service is either not explicitly available in
domestic violence cases or is exceedingly difficult to utilize.31 Service of
process doctrine has generally evolved, but not with respect to domestic
violence remedies.
Service of process is intended to alert respondents to pending legal
proceedings that affect their rights.32 In approaching the issue of service
in domestic violence cases, this Article prioritizes actual notice for the
reasons detailed below, rather than merely satisfying technical service of
process requirements. Alternative service is not intended to simply
produce default judgments. Instead, research and extensive experience
litigating domestic violence cases reveal litigants’ challenges in accessing
the courts,33 and the normative solutions for service of process rules that
this Article identifies would better provide actual notice and reflect
evolving technology and ways of living.34
Service of domestic violence protection orders is both an issue of
access to justice35 and access to safety, as such orders can provide critical
protection at home, school, work, and wherever the protected person may
be in the world. As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,36 once the state creates a remedy, it
cannot deprive the petitioner of a hearing on that claim without due

COMP. L.J. 407 (1997); Finegan, supra note 26, at 1–7; John M. Murphy III, Note, From Snail Mail
to E-Mail: The Steady Evolution of Service of Process, 19 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT 73 (2004);
Angela Upchurch, “Hacking” Service of Process: Using Social Media to Provide Constitutionally
Sufficient Notice of Process, 38 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 559, 587 (2016); William Wagner &
Joshua R. Castillo, Friending Due Process, Facebook as a Fair Method of Alternative Service, 19
WIDENER L. REV. 259, 263 (2013).
30. Hollow v. Hollow, 747 N.Y.S.2d 704, 706–08 (Sup. Ct. 2002). In the first case to authorize eservice under rule 308(5) of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules, email service was acceptable
in a divorce case when sent to a defendant who had been living in Saudi Arabia for two years and had
only communicated with plaintiff through email, and other methods of service were impracticable.
Id. at 708. The court allowed e-service, in combination with service through international registered
and standard mail. Id.
31. Infra Part II. Regarding electronic service, the District of Columbia recently amended its
service rules to be the first jurisdiction to explicitly permit electronic service for civil protection
orders. D.C. SUP. CT. DOM. VIOL. R. 5(a)(3)(A)(i) (West 2018). California, in contrast, did not allow
electronic service for domestic violence matters when it recently amended its laws to permit
alternative service. Act of Aug. 27, 2018, ch. 219, sec. 3, § 6340(2), 2018 Cal. Stat. 2498 (codified at
CAL. FAM. CODE § 6340(2) (West 2018)).
32. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314–15 (1950).
33. Infra Part II.
34. Infra Part V.
35. The concept of access to justice encompasses a broad range of strategies to meet the legal needs
of those who cannot afford counsel, including procedural access and justice issues. See infra notes
38, 126–136 and accompanying text.
36. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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process of law.37 Because claims cannot be heard and substantive relief
cannot be granted without satisfying service requirements, procedural
rules requiring personal service in domestic violence cases present
procedural access barriers. Instead, procedural rules should embrace
procedural fairness and be designed to provide notice to respondents and
safeguard the rights of litigants who need to utilize the legal remedies.38
The obstruction of access to safety and justice is particularly dire for
unrepresented individuals with limited means. Courts recognize that
counsel is often of “central importance”39 to achieving service, but most
abuse survivors lack the means to hire an attorney or private process
server,40 and court staff generally will not answer questions about service
of process or provide other basic legal information.41 Abused individuals,
who must already contend with the physical and psychological effects of

37. Id. at 314–15; see also Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 429 (1982) (“The Court
traditionally has held that the Due Process Clauses protect civil litigants who seek recourse in the
courts, either as defendants hoping to protect their property or as plaintiffs attempting to redress
grievances.”); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380 (1971) (holding that, under the Due Process
Clause, states cannot limit the rights to adjudicatory procedures when doing so is “the equivalent of
denying them an opportunity to be heard on their claimed right”).
38. See Rebecca Aviel, Family Law and the New Access to Justice, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2279,
2292 (2018) (“[I]f there are not enough lawyers to work the system, then we will change the system
so that it relies less on lawyers.”); Jessica K. Steinberg, Demand Side Reform in the Poor People’s
Court, 47 CONN. L. REV. 741, 746 (2015) (explaining that demand-side reform requires the
simplification of evidentiary and procedural rules so that pro se litigants can meaningfully participate
in the court system).
39. See Kleeman v. Rheingold, 614 N.E.2d 712, 716 (N.Y. 1993).
40. JANE C. MURPHY & ROBERT RUBINSON, FAMILY MEDIATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 161
(2009) (reporting that approximately 80% of family law litigants who technically qualify as indigent
and are eligible for free legal assistance are unable to obtain representation); Margo Lindauer,
Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t: Why Multi-Court-Involved Battered Mothers Just Can’t
Win, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 797, 808 (2012) (identifying that the number of pro se
litigants in family law cases is rapidly increasing); see also AM. PSYCH. ASS’N, VIOLENCE &
SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS 2 (2016), https://www.apa.org/pi/ses/resources/publications/factsheetviolence.pdf [https://perma.cc/SJW8-55KY] (“Women who are physically assaulted are significantly
more likely to have unstable employment than women who do not experience intimate partner
violence.” (citations omitted)); id. (“Seventeen percent of cities cited domestic violence as the primary
cause of family homelessness.”); Campbell et al., supra note 11, at 1091 tbl.1 (finding that women
with income of under $10,000 are the largest category of women to experience domestic violence);
Domestic Violence Survivors, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., https://www.nclc.org/specialprojects/domestic-violence-survivors.html [https://perma.cc/UDE5-EEN9] (“Many of these survivors
of domestic violence, in addition to facing physical and emotional concerns, face serious financial
concerns after separating from an abuser.”).
41. Jona Goldschmidt, The Pro Se Litigant’s Struggle for Access to Justice: Meeting the Challenge
of Bench and Bar Resistance, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 36, 47 (2002) (identifying common refusal to provide
information about service, statutes of limitations, methods of enforcing orders, and other basic rulerelated information that is not fact dependent).
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domestic violence, report feeling extremely helpless, scared, and alone in
their efforts to serve their abusers.42
Although individuals of any age or racial, ethnic, economic, sexual, or
gender identity can experience domestic violence, low-income women of
color and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender individuals experience
the highest rates of severe domestic violence.43 Low-income women of
color are also most commonly the petitioners seeking court protection
from abuse and are most affected by the access to justice gap.44 In sum,
those who are most vulnerable to severe and lethal abuse are left to
navigate court processes and make service attempts on their own. Often,
police and abuse survivors cannot achieve personal service, meaning
procedural requirements operate to impede the laws intended to protect
victimized individuals against further abuse.
This Article examines why domestic violence protections differentially
demand personal service. Societal and legal reluctance to recognize
domestic violence, bolstered by persistent disbelief of abuse survivors,45
have resulted in differential treatment of and heightened standards for

42. See Perry, supra note 7.
43. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IDENTIFYING AND PREVENTING GENDER BIAS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT
RESPONSE TO SEXUAL ASSAULT AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 5 (2016) (“Sexual assault and domestic
violence are crimes that disproportionately impact women, girls, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender (LGBT) individuals in the United States.”); NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION &
CONTROL, DIV. OF VIOLENCE PREVENTION, NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE
SURVEY: 2010 FINDINGS ON VICTIMIZATION BY SEXUAL ORIENTATION 2 (2013),
http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/nisvs_sofindings.pdf [https://perma.cc/6U2S-RX2W]
(concluding that 44% of lesbian women and 61% of bisexual women have experienced rape, physical
violence, and/or stalking by an intimate partner); WOMEN OF COLOR NETWORK, WOMEN OF COLOR
NETWORK FACTS & STATS COLLECTION: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN COMMUNITIES OF COLOR 2 (2006),
https://www.doj.state.or.us/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/women_of_color_network_facts_
domestic_violence_2006.pdf [https://perma.cc/3TTA-N6KG] (“African American females
experience intimate partner violence at a rate 35% higher than that of white females, and about 2.5
times the rate of women of other races.”).
44. Tonya L. Brito et al., “I Do for My Kids”: Negotiating Race and Racial Inequality in Family
Court, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3027, 3028 (2015) (“Although the population of low-income Americans
most affected by the civil justice gap is disproportionately minority, race and racial inequality are
understudied areas of inquiry in the access to justice literature.”); see Rebecca L. Sandefur, Access to
Civil Justice and Race, Class, and Gender Inequality, 34 ANN. REV. SOC. 339, 349 (2008).
45. See generally Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105
YALE L.J. 2117, 2167–68 (1996) (detailing the husband’s historic right of chastisement and how courts
characterized marriage as existing beyond law and in a “sphere separate from civil society”); Jane K.
Stoever, Enjoining Abuse: The Case for Indefinite Domestic Violence Protective Orders, 67 VAND. L.
REV. 1015, 1018 (2014) (identifying the recency of the state’s response to domestic violence); Courtney
Fraser, Comment, From “Ladies First” to “Asking for It”: Benevolent Sexism in the Maintenance of
Rape Culture, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 141, 168 (2015) (identifying how consent is imputed for women who
knew their attackers, and providing the example of a Texas county in which from 2008 to 2012, grand
juries “failed to return an indictment in 51 percent of acquaintance rape cases, even when there was
photographic evidence of the assault or when the defendant confessed to the rape”).
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domestic violence relief, including in the civil context.46 The recent
popularization of the #MeToo movement47 reveals how claims of severe
and pernicious abuse often have to be made by multiple abuse survivors
for allegations against an individual to be believed.48 This was true of
Harvey Weinstein, Matt Lauer, Charlie Rose, Larry Nassar, and dozens of
other high-profile individuals,49 including Rob Porter, a top aide in
President Donald Trump’s White House who resigned amidst allegations
and photographic evidence that he had abused his former wives.50
Following Porter’s resignation, Trump tweeted, “Peoples[’] lives are

46. Stoever, supra note 45, at 1015.
47. The hashtag #MeToo was started over a decade ago by African American activist Tarana Burke
as a grassroots movement to aid sexual assault survivors in underserved communities. Based out of
Harlem, she identified the lack of services in her community and began a movement of African
American women talking to each other and sharing their stories. Zahara Hill, A Black Woman Created
the “Me Too” Campaign Against Sexual Assault 10 Years Ago, EBONY MAG. (Oct. 18, 2017),
www.ebony.com/news-views/black-woman-me-too-movement-tarana-burke-alyssa-milano
[https://perma.cc/8TYP-8QHC];
ME
TOO
MOVEMENT,
https://metoomvmt.org
[https://perma.cc/V93Q-QN4P]. On October 15, 2017, building from this movement, actor Alyssa
Milano tweeted, “If all the women who have been sexually harassed or assaulted wrote ‘Me too.’ as
a status, we might give people a sense of the magnitude of the problem.” Alyssa Milano
(@Alyssa_Milano),
TWITTER
(Oct.
15,
2017,
1:21
PM),
https://twitter.com/Alyssa_Milano/status/919659438700670976 [https://perma.cc/6FMQ-8D5D].
48. See Petula Dvorak, Like Trump, Many People Refuse to Believe Domestic Violence Victims. That
Has to Stop., WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/like-trump-manypeople-refuse-to-believe-domestic-violence-victims-that-has-to-stop/2018/02/12/7459e23a-100c-11e89570-29c9830535e5_story.html?utm_term=.cee871810de6 [https://perma.cc/5N67-CB9E]; Catherine
A. MacKinnon, Opinion, #MeToo Has Done What the Law Could Not, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/04/opinion/metoo-law-legal-system.html [https://perma.cc/8MQXWKGD] (noting that in cases of campus sexual assault, “it typically took three to four women testifying
that they had been violated by the same man in the same way to even begin to make a dent in his denial.
That made a woman, for credibility purposes, one-fourth of a person”). The cases receiving national
attention typically involve allegations by multiple individuals. For example, Eric Schneiderman, the
Attorney General of New York who was a prominent figure in the #MeToo movement for taking action
against Harvey Weinstein, was recently accused by four women of domestic violence that included
choking, death threats, and severe sexual and psychological abuse. Jane Mayer & Ronan Farrow, Four
Women Accuse New York’s Attorney General of Physical Abuse, NEW YORKER (May 7, 2018),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/four-women-accuse-new-yorks-attorney-general-ofphysical-abuse [https://perma.cc/B65W-3B7L].
49. See generally Doug Criss, The (Incomplete) List of Powerful Men Accused of Sexual
Harassment
After
Harvey
Weinstein,
CNN
(Nov.
1,
2017,
2:05
PM),
www.cnn.com/2017/10/25/us/list-of-accused-after-weinstein-scandal-trnd/index.html
[https://perma.cc/RK2U-8KAC].
50. Michael D. Shear & Emily Cochrane, The F.B.I., Domestic Abuse and the White House: A
Timeline
of
the
Rob
Porter
Scandal,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
13,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/13/us/politics/rob-porter-fbi-white-house-timeline.html
(last
visited Feb. 12, 2019).
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being shattered and destroyed by a mere allegation”51—a common
sentiment raised about intimate abuse claims.52 The hearing concerning
Dr. Christine Blasey Ford’s allegation of sexual assault against nowSupreme Court Justice Brett Kavanaugh further shows survivors on trial,
disbelief and distrust of claimants, and how even when survivor testimony
is deemed “credible,” abuse may not matter to decision makers.53 Making
domestic violence remedies procedurally accessible, rather than
maintaining current procedural barriers, is essential to correct historic
injustice and abuse and to prevent further intimate partner violence.
Part I identifies the dangers of domestic violence, the escalation of
abuse at the time of separation, and how civil protection orders often
successfully prevent further harm.
Part II details procedural rules regarding domestic violence cases,
including rules requiring the petitioner to give notice to the respondent
prior to seeking a temporary emergency order, rules mandating personal
service for protection order cases, and rules requiring dismissal of cases
for lack of service. Danger related to these rules is discussed, along with
how, while VAWA54 requires that law enforcement effectuate service in
domestic violence cases, insufficient resources are currently devoted to
this task.
Part III evaluates due process rights and concerns. It is well established
that procedural due process requires notice of a legal proceeding and an
opportunity to be heard or to respond, and service of process ensures the
respondent’s right to notice.55 Significantly, the petitioner also has a
constitutionally protected interest in a hearing on the merits of his or her
claim “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,”56 and court
rules must allow access to such a hearing.57 Respondents simply do not
have a due process right to evade service or avoid litigation, and if

51. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 10, 2018, 7:33 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/962348831789797381 [https://perma.cc/6DHM-4F56].
52. See generally Deborah Epstein & Lisa A. Goodman, Discounting Credibility: Doubting the
Testimony and Dismissing the Experiences of Domestic Violence Survivors and Other Women, 167
U. PENN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 1) (on file with author) (discussing how
“routinely women survivors face a Gaslight-style gauntlet of doubt, disbelief, and outright dismissal
of their stories”).
53. See Erica Werner, Some GOP Senators Concede Ford’s Credibility, but Point to Lack of
Corroboration, WASH. POST (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/s
ome-gop-senators-concede-fords-credibility-but-point-to-lack-of-corroboration/2018/09/27/6d97c484c287-11e8-b338-a3289f6cb742_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.defb1af1653d [https://perma.cc
/M7FU-2FR8] (“Republican senators could not deny Thursday that Christine Blasey Ford appeared
credible as she testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee. So they didn’t even try.”).
54. 34 U.S.C. §§ 10450, 10461 (2018); see also infra Section II.C.
55. See Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999).
56. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 437 (1982).
57. Id.; Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
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procedural rules are so stringent as to prevent petitioners from achieving
service, petitioners are denied the right of access to the courts.
Part IV theorizes about the differential treatment of domestic violence
cases, compared to service requirements in other areas of the law in which
liberty, privacy, and financial interests are at stake. It examines the states’
historic acceptance of domestic violence and ongoing exceptionalism
regarding domestic violence remedies. It further discusses demographic
data and the racial, gender, and class-based implications of procedural
barriers to court protection for abuse survivors, along with fact finders’
common disbelief and dismissal of abuse claims.
Part V identifies law reform that would make legal protections for
abuse victims more accessible while being more likely to actually notify
respondents of domestic violence cases. First, states should abrogate laws
that require pre-TRO notice and rescind laws that prevent access to a
hearing on the merits of a petition, such as those requiring the dismissal
of domestic violence cases for lack of service. Second, given VAWA’s
mandate that law enforcement effectuate service for domestic violence
cases, sheriffs and police should make diligent efforts at service, and
failure to achieve personal service by the second hearing date should
provide prima facie reason for permitting alternative service, including by
electronic means to reflect modern life. Due to the safety and logistical
difficulties in accomplishing personal service in many domestic violence
cases, this Article recommends that all states adopt provisions
automatically permitting alternative service after two hearing dates at
which personal service is not achieved. Finally, the Article recommends
that court rules enable petitioners to request alternative means, such as
electronic service, from the outset upon filing domestic violence cases in
situations in which the respondent’s home and employment addresses and
whereabouts are unknown.
The procedural reforms detailed in Part V would protect all rights at
stake—both the respondent’s and petitioner’s procedural rights—and
strike a reasonable balance in doing so. The handful of jurisdictions that
permit alternative service have often been motivated to do so following
tragic events,58 but states need not wait for tragedy before making the
protection order remedy more accessible.


58. See, e.g., Rebecca Jane Griego Act, 2008 Wash. Sess. Laws 1536, 1536–38 (“This act shall be
known as the Rebecca Jane Griego act.”); Rebecca Griego Bill Passes Senate Unanimously, supra
note 16.
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DOMESTIC VIOLENCE DANGERS AND THE NEED FOR
PROTECTION ORDERS

To provide context for the need for procedural access to legal remedies
to protect victimized individuals and their children from domestic abuse,
Section I.A identifies the harms of domestic violence and Section I.B
focuses on the prevalence of “separation assault,” or the heightened risk
of abuse and of lethality at the point of separation. Section I.C examines
the efficacy of domestic violence protection orders, including data
showing that civil protection orders provide the greatest safety outcomes
of any legal relief available, which counsels in favor of making the remedy
accessible.
A.

Domestic Violence Harms

Domestic violence can be defined as the use of physical, sexual,
emotional, economic, or psychological actions or threats of actions in
intimate relationships to exert power and control over the other person.59
The abusive partner may exploit immigration or health status in
perpetrating abuse and engage in severe isolation tactics, such as
restricting movements and associations.60 Racial, ethnic, and gender
identities and poverty often make it more difficult to escape abuse, as
survivors contend with multiple oppressions.61 In sum, domestic violence
includes a range of behaviors that frighten, intimidate, terrorize,
manipulate, injure, or humiliate the abused individual.
Significantly, more than one-third of women who have experienced
intimate partner violence have also experienced birth-control sabotage or

59. STARK, supra note 9, at 85–87.
60. See generally Camille Carey & Robert Solomon, Impossible Choices: Balancing Safety and
Security in Domestic Violence Representation, 21 CLINICAL L. REV. 201 (2014); Tori Cooke,
Understanding Women’s Decision Making: The Intolerable Choice of Living in a Violent House or
Escaping to the Uncertainty of Homelessness and Poverty, 4 PARITY 21 (2015); Jane K. Stoever,
Stories Absent from the Courtroom: Responding to Domestic Violence in the Context of HIV and
AIDS, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1157 (2009) [hereinafter Stoever, Stories Absent] (explaining that domestic
violence responses must comprehensively respond to the multiple intersections survivors face, such
as resource deprivation and language); Jane K. Stoever, Opinion, More Abuse for Victims of Violence:
Those Who Suffer Shouldn’t Have to Choose Between Deportation and Medical Care, L.A. TIMES
(July 17, 2017, 4:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-stoever-mandatoryreporting-domestic-violence-20170717-story.html [https://perma.cc/5KWQ-VRZB].
61. See generally Kimberlé Crenshaw, From Private Violence to Mass Incarceration: Thinking
Intersectionally About Women, Race, and Social Control, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1418 (2012); Kimberlé
Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of
Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1242 (1991) (explaining that women’s experiences of violence are
often shaped by multiple dimensions of their identities, including race and class).
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reproductive coercion.62 Pregnancy is a time of heightened abuse and
onset of serious physical violence, and intimate partner violence occurs
with greater frequency when there are children in the home. 63 Threequarters of women who experience physical intimate partner violence
have minor children who live with them,64 and the abusive partner often
uses children in the abuse, such as threatening to kidnap the children.65
Abuse is also more likely to recur following separation when the parties
have children in common,66 which naturally creates lifelong connections
and opportunities for contact beyond the romantic relationship.
Intimate partner abuse is rarely confined to a single, isolated event;
instead, the abusive partner more commonly engages in an ongoing
process of violence and control.67 Due to the repetitive, escalating nature
of domestic violence, domestic violence survivors are more likely than
victims of stranger violence to be re-assaulted, to experience more severe
violence, and to sustain worse injuries, including weapons-inflicted
injuries.68 As violence escalates, the risk that the abusive partner will kill

62. Elizabeth Miller et al., Pregnancy Coercion, Intimate Partner Violence and Unintended
Pregnancy, 81 CONTRACEPTION 316, 322 (2010). Birth control sabotage refers to an intimate partner
destroying, manipulating, or tampering with contraceptive devices to induce pregnancy. Id.
Reproductive coercion includes “attempts to impregnate a partner against her will, control outcomes
of a pregnancy, coerce a partner to have unprotected sex, and interfere with contraceptive methods.”
AM. COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, COMMITTEE OPINION: REPRODUCTIVE AND
SEXUAL COERCION 1 (2013), https://www.acog.org/-/media/Committee-Opinions/Committee-onHealth-Care-for-Underserved-Women/co554.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20181105T1612568052
[https://perma.cc/CZ3F-K355].
63. Rebecca L. Burch & Gordon G. Gallup Jr., Pregnancy as a Stimulus for Domestic Violence, 19
J. FAM. VIOLENCE 243, 243, 245 (2004).
64. CAL. P’SHIP TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, CALIFORNIA DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FACT SHEET 1
(2011) (“The CWHS also revealed statistically significant higher rates of intimate partner violence
among women who had been pregnant in the last five years (12%). Of those experiencing physical
intimate partner violence, 75% of victims had children under the age of 18 years at home.” (footnote
omitted)); H. LIEN BRAGG, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD PROTECTION IN
FAMILIES EXPERIENCING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 9 (2003) (“An estimated 3.3 to 10 million children a
year are at risk for witnessing or being exposed to domestic violence . . . .”).
65. See Jane K. Stoever, Parental Abduction and the State Intervention Paradox, 92 WASH. L. REV.
861, 862 (2017).
66. Adele Harrell & Barbara Smith, Effects of Restraining Orders on Domestic Violence Victims,
in DO ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 214, 218 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa
eds., 1996).
67. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FULL REPORT OF THE
PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN iii–iv (2000),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/183781.pdf [https://perma.cc/KP2F-6G96].
68. DIV. OF VIOLENCE PREVENTION, NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL,
NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY: 2010 SUMMARY REPORT 90 (2011),
https://www.cdc.gov/ViolencePrevention/pdf/NISVS_Report2010-a.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3LU-
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the victimized individual dramatically increases because of the heightened
likelihood that the perpetrator will use a weapon against the survivor.69
At its most dangerous, domestic violence is lethal. The majority of
female homicide victims are killed through intimate partner violence.70 In
2010, there were 157 domestic violence homicides in California alone.71
The California Department of Justice, Criminal Justice Statistics Center
reports that between 2009 and 2010, while all other homicide types
decreased, intimate partner homicides increased by 20%.72 Nationwide,
50% of individuals incarcerated in state prisons for spousal abuse had
killed their victims73—a statistic that both highlights the lethal nature of
abuse and the rarity of jail sentences for domestic violence.74
B.

Separation Assault

Many abuse survivors seek safety through the courts, but separating
from an abusive partner and initiating legal action against an abuser in

8SQC] (identifying that sexual abuse, intimate partner violence, and stalking “are often repetitive and
can recur over long time periods”); MICHAEL R. RAND, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VIOLENCE-RELATED
INJURIES
TREATED
IN
HOSPITAL
EMERGENCY
DEPARTMENTS
5–8
(1997),
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/4ddb/310658e83a29d5686200d8292db882734ea8.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TG5N-MY75] (reporting that among women treated for intimate partner violence
in emergency rooms, 25% are treated for serious stabs, cuts, and internal injuries); Amy Sisley et al.,
Violence in America: A Public Health Crisis—Domestic Violence, 46 J. TRAUMA 1105, 1105–12
(1999) (finding that 52% of domestic violence survivors receive injuries when being physically
assaulted, as compared to 20% of victims of stranger assault, and measuring reassault over a sixmonth period).
69. See Mary Fan, Disarming the Dangerous: Preventing Extraordinary and Ordinary Violence,
90 IND. L.J. 151, 156 (2014) (“[N]early half of all incidents of firearms-related homicide take place
in the home . . . . [A] substantial proportion of high-risk actors who go on to commit homicidesuicides have a history of assaults and domestic disturbances but have never been in court.”); Amy
Karan & Helen Stampalia, Domestic Violence and Firearms: A Deadly Combination, 79 FLA. B.J.,
Sept. 2005, at 79 (“Family and intimate assaults involving firearms are 12 times more likely to end in
fatality than those not associated with firearms.”).
70. Emiko Petrosky et al., Racial and Ethnic Differences in Homicides of Adult Women and the
Role of Intimate Partner Violence—United States, 2003–2014, 66 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.
REP. 741, 741–46 (2017).
71. CAL. P’SHIP TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 64; KAMALA D. HARRIS, CAL. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, HOMICIDE IN CALIFORNIA, at 31 tbl.24 (2015).
72. CAL. P’SHIP TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 64; HARRIS, supra note 71 (showing an
increase in domestic violence associated homicides in California from 130 to 157 between 2009 and 2010).
73. MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FAMILY VIOLENCE STATISTICS:
INCLUDING
STATISTICS
ON
STRANGERS
AND
ACQUAINTANCES
3
(2005),
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fvs.pdf [https://perma.cc/F6A7-YE5F].
74. See generally LEIGH GOODMARK, DECRIMINALIZING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (2018) (addressing
the lack of efficacy of criminal responses to abuse); Jane K. Stoever, Freedom from Violence: Using
the Stages of Change Model to Realize the Promise of Civil Protection Orders, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 303,
308 (2011) (noting that abuse survivors frequently do not desire a criminal response).
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which the survivor names and details the abuse puts survivors at risk for
heightened danger. Femicide attempts typically occur as abused women
attempt to leave relationships,75 and abuse survivors face the greatest risk
of acute violence and lethality when separating from an abusive partner
and during the period that follows.76 The survivor’s efforts to leave signal
to the abusive partner an impending loss of control, and he or she
frequently responds by escalating control tactics, punishing the survivor
through threats and violence, retaliating for the separation, or attempting
to intimidate the survivor into returning.77 Rather than ensuring the
survivor’s safety, separation from an abusive partner instead often
escalates and intensifies the abuser’s violence. Martha Mahoney describes
the common phenomenon of “separation assault” as efforts and attacks
that “are aimed at preventing or punishing the woman’s autonomy. They
are major—often deadly—power moves.”78
Quantitative and qualitative research confirms that abusive partners
often commit high-level violence when the survivor exits the


75. Jacquelyn C. Campbell et al., Intimate Partner Homicide: Review and Implications of Research
and Policy, 8 TRAUMA VIOLENCE & ABUSE 246, 254 (2007) (finding the first three months after
separation to be the time of most risk, the combination of physical and legal separation presented the
greatest risk for homicide by an intimate partner, and most murders occurred within the first year after
separation); Christina Nicolaidis et al., Could We Have Known? A Qualitative Analysis of Data from
Women Who Survived an Attempted Homicide by an Intimate Partner, 18 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED.
788, 791 (2003).
76. Campbell et al., supra note 11, at 1091 (“When the worst incident of abuse was triggered by
the victim’s having left the abuser for another partner or by the abuser’s jealousy, there was a nearly
5-fold increase in femicide risk . . . . When the incident was triggered by the victim’s having left the
abuser for any other reason, femicide risks were also significantly increased.”); Barbara Hart, Beyond
the “Duty to Warn”: A Therapist’s “Duty to Protect” Battered Women and Children, in FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE 234, 240 (Kersti Yllö & Michele Bograd eds., 1988) (“The decision
by a battered woman to leave is often met with escalated violence by the batterer.”); Catherine F.
Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: An Analysis of State
Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 815–16 (1993) (“Violence is often triggered by the
anger aroused by threatened loss and excessive feelings of dependency—making the period during
and after separation an extremely dangerous time.”); Maribeth L. Rezey, Separated Women’s Risk for
Intimate Partner Violence: A Multiyear Analysis Using the National Crime Victimization Survey, J.
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE, Feb. 21, 2017, at 13 (“On average, separated women were significantly
more likely than divorced (t = 4.03) and never married women (t = 3.91) to be victims of [intimate
partner violence].”).
77. MEYER, supra note 19, at 1; Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining
the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5–7, 65 (1991) (exploring abusers’ violent and coercive
acts when the survivor decides to separate or begins to prepare to leave the abusive partner).
78. Mahoney, supra note 77, at 5–6, 65.
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relationship,79 and approximately two-thirds of all women who separate
from their abusive partners are re-victimized by them.80 Studies have
shown that an abuse survivor’s risk increases by 75% upon leaving, and
heightened danger continues for two years.81 Researchers have
consistently found that at least 75% of reported domestic violence
incidents involved women who were separating from or already separated
from their batterers.82 In addition to the immediate threat of separation
assault, continued abuse can happen over lengthier periods of time.83
Abuse survivors undertake many efforts to protect themselves and their
children from further violence. Rather than passively experiencing abuse,
many abused individuals are actively surviving the abuse by constantly
strategizing, planning, and attempting to achieve freedom from violence.84

79. Ruth E. Fleury et al., When Ending the Relationship Does Not End the Violence: Women’s
Experiences of Violence by Former Partners, 6 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1315, 1376 (2000).
80. Jane Koziol-McLain et al., Predictive Validity of a Screen for Partner Violence Against Women,
21 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 93, 97–99 (2001) (finding that two-thirds of separated abused women
were re-victimized during the four-month period of the study, and stating that “even though abused
women separate from their partners, they do not automatically become safe”); see also Campbell et
al., supra note 11, at 1095 (identifying “estrangement” as a risk factor for intimate partner femicide,
and concluding “extremely controlling abusers are particularly dangerous under conditions of
estrangement”); Kim Y. Slote et al., Battered Mothers Speak Out: Participatory Human Rights
Documentation as a Model for Research and Activism in the United States, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN 1367, 1380 (2005) (“The majority of women said that after they left their expartners and
went to family court, the batterers continued to subject them and their children to some form of abuse
or mistreatment. More than a third said that their expartners stalked them postseparation, and nearly
a quarter said that their expartners threatened to kill them.”).
81. SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT AND
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 10–11 (2012) (“When a battered woman leaves her abuser, her chances of being
killed increase significantly.”).
82. RONET BACHMAN & LINDA E. SALTZMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN:
ESTIMATES
FROM
THE
REDESIGNED
SURVEY
4
(1995),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/FEMVIED.PDF [https://perma.cc/JU47-HA94] (finding that
among domestic violence victims, “the victimization rate of women separated from their husbands
was about 3 times higher than that of divorced women and about 25 times higher than that of married
women”); CAROLYN REBECCA BLOCK, RISK FACTORS FOR DEATH OR LIFE-THREATENING INJURY
FOR ABUSED WOMEN IN CHICAGO 6 (2004), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/199732.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L67Y-BNEL] (“Most clinic/hospital women in this study (85 percent) who had
experienced severe violence in the previous year had left or tried to end the relationship in the previous
year, and most women homicide victims (75 percent) had left or tried to end the relationship in the
previous year.”); Douglas A. Brownridge et al., Violence Against Separated, Divorced, and Married
Women in Canada, 2004, 49 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 308, 309 (2004) (“Separated women
reported 7 times the prevalence of violence and divorced women reported twice the prevalence of
violence than married women in the year prior to the study.”).
83. Andrew R. Klein, Practical Implications of Current Domestic Violence Research, Part I: Law
Enforcement
29–30
(Apr.
2008)
(unpublished
research
report),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/222319.pdf [http://perma.cc/V9J-4EYQ] (while at least
one-third of abusers re-abuse in a short timeframe, more re-abuse in longer periods).
84. See generally Stoever, supra note 74.
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For example, Rebecca Griego had moved multiple times, changed her
phone number, and received accommodations to work from home for a
month so that her abuser could not attack her at work.85 She also sought a
protection order, but was unable to secure full legal protection due to her
inability to personally serve her ex-boyfriend.86
C.

Efficacy of Protection Orders

This Article focuses on increasing access to domestic violence civil
protection orders because protection orders (1) are the legal remedy most
utilized by abuse survivors, even more so than criminal justice
responses,87 and (2) are the most effective legal remedy available to
decrease or eliminate domestic violence.88 In fact, researchers have
concluded that protection orders “appear to be one of the few widely
available interventions for victims of [intimate partner violence] that has
demonstrated effectiveness.”89
The domestic violence protection order remedy is a civil action that
potentially has criminal consequences for violation.90 Civil protection
orders provide injunctive relief to prevent and remedy abuse,91 including
orders prohibiting the abusive party from continued abuse, threats,
stalking, harassment, or possession of a firearm upon a finding of
domestic violence.92 Orders may also prohibit or limit the respondent’s

85. Seattle Times Staff, supra note 6.
86. Brunner & Perry, supra note 4.
87. Susan Keilitz, Improving Judicial System Responses to Domestic Violence: The Promises and
Risks of Integrated Case Management and Technology Solutions, in HANDBOOK OF DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE INTERVENTION STRATEGIES 147, 149 (Albert R. Roberts ed., 2002) (finding that domestic
violence victims are more likely to seek relief from violence solely in the civil system through
protection orders, as compared to using the criminal justice system); Stoever, supra note 74, at 308
(discussing why civil protection orders are the most common legal remedy used for domestic
violence); see also Goldfarb, supra note 10, at 1489 (identifying civil protection orders as the “most
commonly used legal remedy for domestic violence”).
88. Infra notes 101–116 and accompanying text.
89. Victoria Holt et al., Do Protection Orders Affect the Likelihood of Future Partner Violence and
Injury?, 24 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 16, 21 (2003).
90. In re Marriage of Holtorf, 922 N.E.2d 1173 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010); Rankin v. Criswell, 277 S.W.3d
621 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008); E.C.O. v. Compton, 984 N.E.2d 787 (Mass. 2013); J.D. v. M.D.F., 25 A.3d
1045 (N.J. 2011).
91. Wolt v. Wolt, 2010 ND 33, 778 N.W.2d 802; State ex rel. Cockerham v. Cockerham, 218
S.W.3d 298 (Tex. App. 2007).
92. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-1005 (West 2019) (describing the different forms of relief a court
can award).
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contact with protected parties, including the petitioner, petitioner’s
children, and household members; order the respondent to participate in
batterer intervention treatment, parenting skills classes, a psychological
evaluation, or drug or alcohol treatment; award custody, visitation, child
support, spousal support, or payment for medical bills or property
damage; and award possession of pets and property, among other relief
necessary to the effective resolution of the matter.93
Domestic violence protection order proceedings are intended to
“quickly and effectively” intervene in abusive situations and prevent the
tragic escalation of violence.94 Protection orders are “remedial in nature,”
and courts agree that domestic violence law is to be “broadly construed to
‘effectuate its humanitarian and preventive purposes.’”95 Numerous
courts identify that the proceedings are intended to be “summary in
nature”96 and “expeditious.”97 States also consistently indicate that the
civil protection order relief shall be “immediate”98 and “easily
accessible.”99 Appellate courts in Texas, for example, explain that the
statute authorizing the domestic violence remedy is intended to “provide
an expedited procedure for victims of domestic violence; the purpose is
not to correct past wrongs or establish liability but to give immediate
protection to the applicant.”100
Multiple studies have shown that protection orders are effective at
eliminating or markedly decreasing abuse101 and at helping survivors feel

93. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 6200 (West 2018) (describing various forms of relief available
upon a finding of domestic abuse).
94. Hanneman v. Nygaard, 2010 ND 113, 784 N.W.2d 117, 123; see also Lear v. Jamrogowicz,
2013 MT 147, ¶26, 370 Mont. 320, 303 P.3d 790 (“The object of a [proceeding for a temporary order
of protection] is the swift and efficient protection of one who is being harassed and intimidated by
another.”).
95. Roper v. Jolliffe, 493 S.W.3d 624, 634 (Tex. App. 2015) (citing Boyd v. Palmore, 425 S.W.3d
425, 430 (Tex. App. 2011)).
96. Hanneman, 784 N.W.2d at 123.
97. Putman v. Kennedy, 932 A.2d 439, 442–43 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007) (“The legislature
promulgated § 46b–15 to provide an expeditious means of relief for abuse victims.”).
98. N.Y. FAMILY LAW § 812(2)(b) (McKinney 2018); In re Rollerson v. New, 901 N.Y.S.2d 515
(Fam. Ct. 2010) (identifying that the purpose of New York’s civil domestic violence remedies is to
provide immediate redress from abuse or from specified criminal acts committed by an intimate
partner or household member without requiring an arrest or criminal prosecution).
99. LA. STAT. ANN. § 46:2131 (West 2018) (regarding the Domestic Abuse Assistance Act, “It is
the intent of the legislature to provide a civil remedy for domestic violence which will afford the
victim immediate and easily accessible protection.”); Dvilansky v. Correu, 204 So.3d 686, 689 (La.
Ct. App. 2016).
100. Roper, 493 S.W.3d at 634.
101. See generally Matthew Carlson et al., Protective Orders and Domestic Violence: Risk Factors
for Re-Abuse, 14 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 205 (1999) (concluding that abuse survivors experience a
“significant decline in the probability of abuse” following the entry of a civil protection order); see
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safer and more empowered.102 A study of nearly 2,700 women who had
reported domestic violence to the police found that those who obtained
civil protection orders experienced an 80% decrease in subsequent policereported physical violence.103 Overall, these women experienced
significantly decreased likelihoods of physical and non-physical intimate
partner violence, including decreased risk of contact by the abusive
partner, weapon threats, injuries, and abuse-related medical treatment.104
Many abused individuals never make police reports, so police data only
reveal a portion of domestic violence incidents,105 but qualitative studies

also Victoria Holt et al., Civil Protection Orders and Risk of Subsequent Police-Reported Violence,
288 JAMA 589, 590–92 (2002) (conducting a population-based study and reviewing police records
to examine the effectiveness of protection orders, and finding that having a permanent protection
order was associated with a significantly decreased risk of new episodes of violence); Catherine L.
Kothari et al., Protection Orders Protect Against Assault and Injury: A Longitudinal Study of PoliceInvolved Women Victims of Intimate Partner Violence, 27 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 2845, 2859
(2012) (confirming the “protective effect of [protection orders], which are associated with reduced
police incidents and emergency department visits both during and after the order, and reduced police
incidents compared to a matched comparison group”); Judith McFarlane et al., Intimate Partner
Violence Against Immigrant Women: Measuring the Effectiveness of Protection Orders, 16 AM. J.
FAM. L. 244, 248 (2002) (finding that immigrant women who sought protection orders experienced a
significant decrease in violence and stalking throughout the duration of the study, comparable to
reduced violence experienced by women born in the United States who receive protection orders, and
concluding, “[c]learly, contact with the justice system and application for a protection order is a
powerful deterrent to further abuse and can be deemed highly effective in terms of subsequent intimate
partner violence against immigrant women”); Judith McFarlane et al., Protection Orders and Intimate
Partner Violence: An 18-Month Study of 150 Black, Hispanic, and White Women, 94 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 613, 613–18 (2004) (finding significant reductions in physical assaults, stalking, threats to
do bodily harm, and worksite harassment among women who sought and qualified for protection
orders); cf. Jane C. Murphy, Engaging with the State: The Growing Reliance on Lawyers and Judges
to Protect Battered Women, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 499, 510–14 (recognizing that
abuse survivors use multiple legal and non-legal strategies to prevent violence; that obtaining only an
emergency TPO achieves some women’s goals; and that significant institutional barriers and the lack
of representation make it difficult for many litigants to complete the protection order process).
102. TK Logan et al., Factors Associated with Separation and Ongoing Violence Among Women
with Civil Protective Orders, 23 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 377, 382 (2008) (In a study of 700 women who
received protection orders, 78% reported that they felt safe as a result of the order and that the orders
were effective.).
103. Holt et al., supra note 101, at 591–92.
104. Id.
105. See Michelle Fugate et al., Barriers to Domestic Violence Help Seeking, 11 VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 290, 295 (2005) (In a study of nearly 500 abused women who were receiving
medical care in a public health clinic or hospital, 62% of the women had not called the police for
help.); see also TK LOGAN & ROB VALENTE, WHO WILL HELP ME? DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
SURVIVORS SPEAK OUT ABOUT LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSES
2
(2015),
http://www.thehotline.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2015/09/NDVH-2015-Law-EnforcementSurvey-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WXD-2CTV] (reporting results of a 2015 survey conducted by
the National Domestic Violence Hotline, which found that one-quarter of abuse survivors who had
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with abuse survivors show dramatic decreases in rates of physical and
non-physical abuse following the entry of a civil protection order. In one
study, 86% of the women who received a protection order stated that the
abuse either stopped or was greatly reduced.106 Another interview-based
study found a 70% decrease in physical abuse among women who
maintained their protection orders.107
Courts can issue temporary protection orders (TPO) on an ex parte
basis to provide immediate safety protection against imminent harm, but
such orders are typically only in effect for five days to three weeks at a
time.108 Permanent or long-term protection orders produce more
substantial safety outcomes.109 Multiple studies have found a correlation
between the duration of the protection order and the survivor’s safety,
which researchers describe as a “dose-response relationship according to
the duration of the [civil protection order].”110 Having long-term orders,
rather than merely a TPO, therefore, can be key to significantly decreasing
future violence and sustaining an end to abuse.111
Significantly, abuse survivors perceive the orders as valuable,
effective, and crucial to their safety.112 In a study of women who had

previously called the police to report abuse would not call police again to report intimate violence;
80% of these respondents worried that a future call to the police would result in the police doing
nothing or not believing them, and a majority feared that calling the police again would make the
violence worse).
106. JAMES PTACEK, BATTERED WOMEN IN THE COURTROOM: THE POWER OF JUDICIAL RESPONSE
164 (1999); see also Julia Henderson Gist et al., Protection Orders and Assault Charges: Do Justice
Interventions Reduce Violence Against Women, 15 AM. J. FAM. L. 59, 60 (2001) (discussing James
Ptacek’s research on the effectiveness of protection orders).
107. Holt et al., supra note 89, at 20.
108. D.C. CODE § 16–1004 (West 2019); CAL. FAM. CODE § 6256 (West 2019).
109. Carlson et al., supra note 101, at 214 (showing a 66% overall decline in women reporting
violence before and after protection orders during a two-year follow-up period, with a 68% decline in
those with permanent orders, compared to a 52% reduction in violence for those with temporary
orders); Holt et al., supra note 89, at 20 (finding significant decreases in risk among women who kept
their protection orders in effect over time).
110. Holt et al., supra note 89, at 21.
111. Factors in addition to protection order duration can contribute to the effectiveness of
protection orders. For example, orders that contain more comprehensive and specified relief are more
likely to provide protection to survivors. TK Logan et al., Protective Orders in Rural and Urban
Areas, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 876, 906 (2005). Differences in communities’ implementation
and enforcement of orders and in the availability of confidential shelters and other safety resources in
a geographic region can also affect the efficacy of orders. Id. at 899.
112. TK Logan & Robert Walker, Civil Protection Order Outcomes: Violations and Perceptions
of Effectiveness, 24 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 675, 677–78, 682–83 (2009) (reporting on a study
of 700 women with protection orders and finding that 51% believed the orders were “extremely
effective” and 27% found their orders to be “fairly effective,” while 14% did not find the orders
effective and 7% were unsure).
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recently obtained TPOs, 98% of women felt more in control of their lives,
91% felt that obtaining the order was a good decision, and 89% felt more
in control of their relationship due to the court order.113 A majority of
women also report feeling safer after obtaining permanent protection
orders. In a study of nearly 700 women who had received permanent
protection orders, 43% felt “extremely safe” and 34% felt “fairly safe,”
while 10% did not feel safe and 12% were unsure about how they felt.114
Although protection order recipients generally experience an overall
decrease in violence, approximately one-half of protective orders are
violated by abusive partners.115 The rate of violation increases to more
than two-thirds when the respondent has previously raped or stalked the
abuse survivor.116 Despite the high rates of violations, the orders are
associated with a reduction in the severity and frequency of violence and
the fear of harm for the majority of abuse survivors.117 The overall
decrease in violence demonstrates the value and potential of protection
orders, while the re-abuse rates show the need for continued court
protection and improved abuse prevention efforts and community
responses to abuse.
While abuse survivors most commonly choose civil protection orders
among criminal and civil legal options, this legal remedy is not the
solution for every abused individual. The courtroom environment and
public nature of these adversarial proceedings have adverse psychological
effects on some survivors. Psychiatrist Judith Herman observes, “If one
set out by design to devise a system for provoking intrusive post-traumatic

113. Karla Fischer & Mary Rose, When “Enough is Enough”: Battered Women’s Decision Making
Around Orders of Protection, 41 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 414, 417 (1995).
114. Logan & Walker, supra note 112, at 683 (finding that women who experienced very severe
violence or stalking felt less safe than protection order recipients who had not had such experiences).
115. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXTENT, NATURE, AND
CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY 52 (2000), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/181867.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KP2F-6G96] (noting that the National Violence Against Women survey found
69.7% of those stalked, 67.6% of those sexually assaulted, and 50.6% of those physically assaulted
by a partner reported a violation of the order); Logan & Walker, supra note 112, at 682–83 (studying
700 women with protection orders using self-reports of specific violent behaviors, arrest records for
protection order violations, and perceptions of violations, and finding that three-fifths of women
experienced a violation of the order and there was no difference in violation rates between urban and
rural jurisdictions).
116. TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 115, at 52.
117. Jaime Kay Dahlstedt, Notification and Risk Management for Victims of Domestic Violence,
28 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 1, 8 (2013).
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symptoms, one could not be better than a court of law.”118 State
intervention—whether civil or criminal—can prompt numerous
unexpected consequences for abuse survivors.119 In some jurisdictions,
the report of children being present during intimate partner violence
triggers a Child Protective Services investigation and a “failure to protect”
case to be filed against the abuse survivor under the theory that the victim
should have protected the children from being exposed to violence.120 A
majority of states allow public access to civil protection order filings,121
and survivors may have privacy concerns given the potential for
discrimination in housing, employment, professional licensure, and
welfare benefits contexts122 and health, life, and home owner’s
insurance,123 along with potential immigration consequences.124 This
Article recognizes that not every abuse survivor may wish to pursue a
protection order, but when a survivor seeks this court-ordered protection,
the civil protection order remedy should be available.

118. JUDITH HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY 72 (1992); see also Stoever, Stories Absent, supra
note 60, at 1189–90 (discussing the public nature of domestic violence proceedings and survivors’
concerns about revealing personal information about the petitioner or respondent in open court).
119. See generally Jane K. Stoever, Mirandizing Family Justice, 39 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 189 (2016).
120. DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE 76 (2002) (“In
some states it is considered neglect to permit a child to witness adults fight in the home. When a
mother calls the police to report she has been beaten, she may be confessing to child neglect.”); see
also Naomi R. Cahn, Models of Family Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1225, 1244 (1999)
(identifying that poor women of color are disproportionately targeted by the child welfare system);
Justine A. Dunlap, Sometimes I Feel Like a Motherless Child: The Error of Pursuing Battered
Mothers for Failure to Protect, 50 LOY. L. REV. 565, 601–02 (2004); Ijeoma Nwabuzor Ogbonnaya
et al., Domestic Violence and Immigration Status Among Latina Mothers in the Child Welfare System:
Findings from the National Survey of Child and Adolescent Well-Being II (NSCAW II), 39 CHILD
ABUSE & NEGLECT 197 (2015).
121. Joann Sahl, Can We Forgive Those Who Batter?, 100 MARQ. L. REV. 527, 530 (2016).
122. Nina W. Tarr, Civil Orders for Protection: Freedom or Entrapment?, 11 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 157, 159–60, 181 (2003) (recommending that lawyers and advocates counsel abuse survivors
about the potential negative consequences of civil protection orders).
123. Emily C. Wilson, Stop Re-Victimizing the Victims: A Call for Stronger State Laws Prohibiting
Insurance Discrimination Against Victims of Domestic Violence, 23 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y
& L. 413, 416, 430 (2015) (detailing insurance classifications based on domestic violence and the
need for heightened legal protection); see also Michael J. Sudekum, Homeowner’s Policies and
Missouri Law Make Recovery for the Domestic Violence Victim/Co-Insured an Olympic Challenge,
69 UMKC L. REV. 363, 363 (2000).
124. See Natalie Nanasi, A Fraught Pairing: Immigrant Survivors of Intimate Partner Violence and
Law Enforcement, in THE POLITICIZATION OF SAFETY (Jane K. Stoever ed., forthcoming 2019);
Angelica S. Reina et al., “He Said They’d Deport Me”: Factors Influencing Domestic Violence HelpSeeking Practices Among Latina Immigrants, 29 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 593 (2013); Jane K.
Stoever, How New U.S. Immigration Policy Is Hurting Domestic Violence Victims, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIBUNE (July 26, 2018, 4:45 PM), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/
opinion/commentary/sd-oe-immigration-deportation-domestic-abuse-20180726-story.html [https:/
/perma.cc/UZD6-2Q3M].
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SURVIVORS SEEKING SAFETY: SERVICE CHALLENGES
AND RISKS

Service requirements create access to justice issues, particularly for
unrepresented individuals with limited means. Access to justice—as a
movement or as a principle—has many meanings.125 At its core, the
“access to justice” movement has been about remedying the inability of
most Americans—including low-income and
middle-income
individuals—to afford counsel for civil legal problems, and the resulting
“pro se crisis” that overwhelms many civil courts.126 The movement has
broadened to encompass an expansive range of strategies to meet the legal
needs of individuals who cannot afford counsel.127 Dimensions of
accessing justice include: access to information necessary to navigate
legal proceedings and understand the law,128 fair treatment by judicial
officers and court staff,129 and access to a personal sense of fairness and
justice in the proceedings and outcomes of legal matters.130 Achieving
procedural access by making court processes and rules accessible to the
majority of individuals who use the courts and remedies—in this case,
domestic violence courts and litigants—is essential to accessing justice.131
The petitioner must properly serve the opposing party under the law
before a judge may enter a legal remedy, but current notice and personal
service requirements in domestic violence cases are unduly burdensome
and dangerous for many petitioners. This Part details the current legal

125. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 10 (2010) (raising access to justice concerns about the
“retreat from the principles of citizen access, private enforcement of public policies, and equality of
litigant treatment in favor of corporate interests and concentrated wealth”).
126. Aviel, supra note 38, at 2292; Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice: A Roadmap for Reform,
41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1227, 1228 (2014) (“Over four-fifths of the poor’s legal needs and two- to
three-fifths of the legal needs of middle-income Americans remain unmet.”).
127. Aviel, supra note 38, at 2292; Gary Blasi, Framing Access to Justice: Beyond Perceived
Justice for Individuals, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 913, 914 (2009) (critiquing the traditional narrow
framing of “access to justice”).
128. See generally PAUL T. JAEGER ET AL., LIBRARIES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE
(2015) (identifying access to information as a component of access to justice).
129. See Paris Baldacci, Assuring Access to Justice: The Role of the Judge in Assisting Pro Se
Litigants in Litigating Their Cases in New York City’s Housing Court, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y &
ETHICS J. 659, 661–62 (2006).
130. Gary Blasi, How Much Access? How Much Justice?, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 865, 870–83 (2004).
131. See Aviel, supra note 38, at 2292; Steinberg, supra note 38, at 746; Richard Zorza, Some First
Thoughts on Court Simplification: The Key to Civil Access and Justice Transformation, 61 DRAKE L.
REV. 845, 847–50; cf. Elizabeth L. MacDowell, Reimagining Access to Justice in the Poor People’s
Courts, 22 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 473, 498, 503 (2015) (cautioning against “informalism”
and “delegalization” in family law cases and structuring systems in ways that treat litigants as childlike and “in need of state supervision”).
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landscape in four areas. Section II.A identifies that some jurisdictions
require petitioners to notify respondents prior to seeking an ex parte TPO
and before receiving any court-ordered protection. Section II.B provides
data from a fifty-state survey showing that all jurisdictions require
personal service for civil protection orders, and a minority of states make
alternative service available upon a showing of “diligent efforts” at
personal service. Section II.C discusses VAWA’s mandate that law
enforcement serve domestic violence cases for free. Section II.D explores
how jurisdictions dismiss domestic violence cases for lack of service
despite the mandate for law enforcement to effectuate service, and some
jurisdictions’ court rules require judges to do so.
A.

Notice of Ex Parte Temporary Protection Order Requests

Although the point at which an abused individual attempts to separate
from an abusive partner is the time of greatest danger, problematically,
current laws in some states require a domestic violence victim to provide
advanced notice to the abusive partner before filing for a temporary civil
protection order. For example, Sierra County, California, requires that the
petitioner notify the respondent by 10:00 a.m. the day prior to filing for a
TPO,132 and Orange County, California, requires that the petitioner give
four-hour notice to the respondent before the court will consider an ex
parte petition for a temporary domestic violence protection order.133 This
is typically accomplished by the petitioner or petitioner’s counsel
telephoning the respondent to alert him or her to the planned request for a
temporary order and to the date, time, and location at which the
respondent can appear to object to the request for a TPO.134 Not only does
providing notice at this stage make it easier for the respondent to then
evade personal service, it can also endanger abuse survivors by enraging
respondents before court protection is ordered.
Such advanced notice alerts an abusive partner to the exact location of
a victim at a time when the risk of an abusive partner inflicting severe or
lethal violence is highest and before a court has ordered temporary legal
protection. An abuse survivor who has escaped to a confidential location
can now be followed back to a shelter or other undisclosed location.
Beyond the immediate risk of physical violence against the victim,
advanced notice may facilitate parental abduction, with the respondent

132. SIERRA CTY. SUP. CT. R. 6.14(a) (providing an exception for “exceptional circumstances”).
133. ORANGE CTY. SUP. CT. R. 704(A)(1).
134. Id.; Declaration Re: Notice of Ex Parte Application (Family Law), ORANGE COUNTY CTS.,
https://www.occourts.org/forms/local/l1124.pdf [https://perma.cc/3W2E-QQHQ].
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taking children from daycare or school before a court order is in place.135
Increasingly, advance notice can also result in immigration consequences,
with the respondent alerting U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) officers to the location of an undocumented abuse survivor, and ICE
officers making arrests at domestic violence and human trafficking
court.136
Judicial officers and abuse victims recognize the inherent danger. As
the Orange County Court Executive Officer noted, “On the initial request
of a temporary [civil protection] order, I don’t see how having an alleged
batterer meet an alleged victim at the courthouse doors is a good idea.”137
One courthouse advocate recounted overhearing a petitioner provide notice
and the respondent scream in the background, “We’re all gonna die . . . .”138
Tragically, petitioner Paula Manuel’s estranged husband Brian Manuel
killed their four-year-old son after she provided the mandated notice.139
She stated, “Absolutely, it gave him a heads-up . . . when I called him, it
just made him more angry.”140 After she gave the four-hour notice, he
called her incessantly and left threatening messages that warned: “If we
don’t reconcile, life as we all know it will change.” Brian then picked up
their child from daycare, as there was no order in place to prevent him
from doing so, before shooting Paula and killing their son.141

135. Stoever, Parental Abduction, supra note 65, at 876, 883 (identifying that most abducted
children are taken by a parent and describing child abductions by domestically abusive parents as the
ultimate abuse).
136. Steve Coll, When a Day in Court Is a Trap for Immigrants, NEW YORKER (Nov. 8, 2017),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/when-a-day-in-court-is-a-trap-for-immigrants
[https://perma.cc/6Q7V-PU3E]; Beth Fertig, Outcry After Immigration Agents Seen at Queens
Human Trafficking Court, WNYC NEWS (June 16, 2017), https://www.wnyc.org/story/outcry-afterimmigration-agents-come-trafficking-victim-queens-courthouse
[https://perma.cc/E7DE-X53D];
Katie Mettler, ICE Detains Woman Seeking Domestic Abuse Protection at Texas Courthouse, WASH.
POST (Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/02/16/this-isreally-unprecedented-ice-detains-woman-seeking-domestic-abuse-protection-at-texascourthouse/?utm_term=.526f1cd99905 [https://perma.cc/6TQR-XVAG]; James Queally, ICE Agents
Make Arrests at Courthouses, Sparking Backlash from Attorneys and State Supreme Court, LA TIMES
(Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-ice-courthouse-arrests-20170315story.html [https://perma.cc/39EH-H48K].
137. Rhor, supra note 18 (quoting Alan Slater, Orange County Court Executive Officer).
138. Id. (quoting advocate Giovanna Businaro’s experience observing petitioners’ anxiety and fear
and how some abuse survivors decide to forego seeking court protection when they learn of the notice
requirements).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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In contrast to these court rules, courts in many other jurisdictions are
able to issue TPOs on an ex parte basis for limited periods to provide
immediate protection from violence.142 Jurisdictions including
Alabama,143 the District of Columbia, and Minnesota require a showing
of past domestic violence and an imminent threat of harm144 or
“immediate and present danger of domestic abuse”145 for an ex parte TPO.
Depending on the state, a hearing for a “permanent” protection order must
be set within one to three weeks,146 so the ex parte TPO is of limited
duration. While the temporary order provides immediate safety remedies,
determinations of possession of property, financial awards, longer-term
custody, and therapeutic treatment remedies are typically reserved for the
noticed hearing.147
Multiple states have determined that issuing TPOs without providing
notice to the respondent does not violate due process.148 For example, in
the Minnesota case, Baker v. Baker,149 the respondent challenged the ex
parte temporary order that awarded temporary child custody to his
estranged wife and required him to vacate their residence. The Minnesota
Supreme Court determined that requiring pre-deprivation notice to an

142. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-3 (2018); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-6304 (West 2018); IND.
CODE § 34-26-5-2 (2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 3 (2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2950
(2018); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-102 (2017); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-924 (2018); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 33.020 (2017) (all of the foregoing permitting a temporary order to be granted with or without notice
to the respondent, and not specifying danger of immediate harm); N.H. REV. STAT. § 173-B:3 (2018);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8–8.1-3 (2018); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-7-103 (West 2018); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, § 1104 (2018) (all of the foregoing permitting temporary orders to be issued ex parte, without
notice to the respondent, upon motion or findings that the respondent has abused the petitioner or
petitioner’s children, or both); D.C. CODE § 16-1004(b) (2019); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.50.020
(2018); WIS. STAT. § 813.12(3)(b) (2017) (all of the foregoing not requiring notice be given to the
respondent before a temporary restraining order is entered against the respondent named in the
petition).
143. United States v. Hamm, 134 Fed. App’x 328, 330 (11th Cir. 2005) (Alabama’s Protection
from Abuse Act allows for the issuance of an ex parte protection order as “necessary to protect the
plaintiff or minor children from abuse, or the immediate and present danger of abuse to the plaintiff
or minor children, upon good cause shown in an ex parte proceeding”).
144. D.C. CODE § 16-1004(b)(1) (requiring a showing that “the safety or welfare of the petitioner
or a household member is immediately endangered by the respondent”).
145. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01(7)(a) (2018).
146. Hamm, 134 Fed. App’x at 330; see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.110(a) (2018) (permitting
TPOs to last for twenty days); D.C. CODE § 16–1004(b)(2) (stating that an initial TPO is issued for
two weeks).
147. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6340-46 (West 2018).
148. Baker v. Baker, 494 N.W.2d 282, 286 (Minn. 1992); Ferris v. Ferris, 12th Dist. Clermont No.
CA2005–05–043, 2006-Ohio-878 (finding good cause for issuing an ex parte TPO); State v. Karas,
108 Wash. App. 692, 698, 32 P.3d 1016, 1019 (2001) (determining that courts have the authority to
issue ex parte TPOs pending hearing).
149. 494 N.W.2d 282.
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alleged abusive partner would endanger the victim, thereby defeating the
Domestic Abuse Act’s150 purpose of providing immediate protection to
domestic violence victims.151 Because the Act offers relief to persons at
risk of ongoing domestic violence, the court reasoned that ex parte
protection is “central to the substantive relief provided for under the Act,”
and that requiring pre-deprivation notice was not only inappropriate, it
could actually precipitate increased violence.152
B.

Personal Service for Domestic Violence Remedies

Across the United States, personal service is expected in domestic
violence protection order cases and fulfills notice requirements.153 Some
state family law codes go even further and provide heightened procedural
requirements for domestic violence remedies, explicitly exempting these
remedies from alternate pathways to service.154 For example, when
Petitioner Paula Manuel sought a domestic violence protection order in
California against her estranged husband, she was unable to achieve
personal service.155 When she told the judge about her fears for her safety,
based in part on his work as a security guard and ownership of multiple
guns, and that she believed her husband was deliberately evading service,
the judge responded that there was nothing he could do under the law until
her husband was personally served.156

150. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01.
151. Baker, 494 N.W.2d at 286.
152. Id.
153. ALA. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(1); ALASKA R. CIV. P. 4(d); ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 4.1; ARK. R. CIV. P. 4(d); CAL.
FAM. CODE § 243 (West 2018); COLO. R. CIV. P. 4(e)(1); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-57(a) (2019); DEL.
FAM. CT. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(1); D.C. SUPER. CT. DOM. VIO. R. 5(a)(3)(A)(i); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 48.031
(2018); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-4(e)(7) (2018); HAW. R. FAM. CT. 4(d)(1); IDAHO R. CIV. P. (4)(d)(1);
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-203 (2018); IND. R. CIV. P. 4.1; IOWA. R. CIV. P. 1.305(1); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-303(d)(1)(A) (2018); KY. R. CIV. P. 4.04(2); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1232–34; ME. R. CIV.
P. 4(d); MD. R. CIV. P. 3-124(b); MASS. R. CIV. P. 4(d); MICH. CT. R. 2.105(A); MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.03(a);
MISS. R. CIV. P. 4(d); MO. ANN. STAT. § 506.150 (West 2018); MONT. R. CIV. P. 4(e); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 25-508.01 (2018); NEV. R. CIV. P. 4(d); N.H. REV. STAT. § 510:2 (2018); N.J. R. CIV. P. 4:4-4; N.M. R.
CIV. P. 1-004(F); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 308 (McKinney 2018); N.C. R. CIV. P. 4(j)(1)(a); N.D. R. CIV. P.
4(d)(1); OHIO R. CIV. P. 4.1(B); 12 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 2004 (West 2018); OR. R. CIV. P. 7(D)(2)(a),
(3)(A)(1); PA. R. CIV. P. NO. 402; R.I. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(1); S.C. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(1); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 15-6-4(d)(8) (2018); TENN. R. CIV. P. 4.04(1); TEX. R. CIV. P. 106(a)(1); UTAH R. CIV. P. (4)(d)(1)(A);
VT. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(1); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.02-296(1) (2018); WASH. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(2); W. VA. R. CIV.
P. 4(d)(1); WIS. STAT. § 8.01.11(1) (2018); WYO. R. CIV. P. 4(e).
154. CAL. FAM. CODE § 243.
155. Rhor, supra note 18.
156. Id.
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Less than one-third of states explicitly make available alternative forms
of service in domestic violence cases when personal service had been
unsuccessful. These states include Alabama,157 Alaska,158 California,159
Illinois,160 Michigan,161 Minnesota,162 Nevada,163 New Jersey,164 New
York,165 Rhode Island,166 Washington,167 West Virginia,168 Wisconsin,169
and the District of Columbia.170

157. ALA. CODE § 30-5-7 (2018); ALA. R. CIV. P. 4.3(d)(1), (e)(1). Service may be completed
through personal delivery by a process server or by certified mail. A court may, on motion, order
service to be made by publication when a defendant avoids service or for failure of service due to
unknown present location. Id.
158. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 4(e).
159. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6340(a)(2) (West 2018) (amended in 2018 to permit alternative service).
160. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-206(a) (2018); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/103 (2018). Service on a
member of respondent’s household or by publication shall be adequate if petitioner has made all
reasonable efforts to accomplish actual service personally on respondent and respondent cannot be
found and petitioner files an affidavit or sworn testimony as to those efforts. Id.
161. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2950(18) (West 2018) (requiring personal service or service
by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested).
162. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01 (2018). Personal service attempts may be followed by service through
a one-week published notice when the petitioner files an affidavit concerning the unsuccessful
personal service attempts and stating that a copy has been mailed to the last known residence. Id.
163. NEV. REV. STAT. § 33.030 (2017). The appropriate law enforcement agency shall personally
serve the respondent. When a current address is unknown or the agency has made at least two
unsuccessful attempts at the current place of employment, service may be completed by delivery to
the respondent’s current place of employment and by mailing a copy to the current place of
employment. Id.
164. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25–28 (West 2018) (initially requiring personal service, but permitting
courts to order “other appropriate substituted service” if personal service cannot be effected).
165. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 153(b) (McKinney 2019) (requiring police officers to attempt personal
service); id. § 826 (permitting courts to make an order for substituted service).
166. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8–8.1–3 (2018). The order shall be personally served by a deputy sheriff or
certified constable. If either have been unable to personally serve the respondent after diligent efforts,
the court may order an alternative method of service, including, but not limited to, certified and regular
mail at the last known address or place of employment, leaving copies at the dwelling with a person
of suitable age, or by publication in a newspaper for two consecutive weeks. Id.
167. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.50.050 (2018).
Except as provided in RCW 26.50.085 and 26.50.123, personal service shall be made upon the
respondent not less than five court days prior to the hearing. If timely personal service cannot be
made, the court shall set a new hearing date and shall either require an additional attempt at
obtaining personal service or permit service by publication as provided in RCW 26.50.085 or
service by mail as provided in RCW 26.50.123. The court shall not require more than two
attempts at obtaining personal service and shall permit service by publication or by mail unless
the petitioner requests additional time to attempt personal service. If the court permits service by
publication or by mail, the court shall set the hearing date not later than twenty-four days from
the date of the order.
Id.
168. W. VA. CODE § 48-27-501 (2018). Unsuccessful attempts at personal service may be followed
by service through a published notice and simultaneous first class mail of the court order to the last
known address. Id.
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The majority of states that permit alternative service do so only when
a petitioner files a motion or affidavit requesting alternative service and
following a judicial determination that the petitioner made diligent efforts
to attempt personal service and judicial approval of an alternate method
best suited to accomplish actual notice.171 Many petitioners do not know
that requesting alternative service is possible, and the process presents
logistical hurdles.172
C.

VAWA’s Promise of Service

Since 2000, VAWA has required law enforcement agencies to serve
protection order petitions and court orders on respondents without
charging fees to petitioners.173 Significantly, police and sheriff
departments that charge for service of protection orders jeopardize their
federal grant funding and may be noncompliant with their own state laws
and policies.174 The broad mandate for accomplishing service does not
suggest the number of attempts at personal service law enforcement
should make, that law enforcement must make reasonable efforts, or
standards for communicating with petitioners; this important
advancement remains an imperfect solution due to its drafting and
execution.
While the requirement that law enforcement attempt service for free is
an extremely important mechanism for achieving service in some cases,
“[g]iven sheer volume, over-worked law enforcement personnel may have


169. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 813.125(2)(a) (West 2018) (permitting petitioners to file affidavits with
the court about private process servers and law enforcement being unable to achieve personal service,
and then permitting judges to authorize alternative service methods).
170. D.C. SUPER. CT. DOM. VIO. R. 5(a)(3)(A)(i), (D)(i)–(iv). A respondent shall be personally
served. If the court determines that, after diligent effort, service has been unsuccessful, it may permit
alternative service through delivery to respondent’s employer, registered or certified mail with return
receipt requested, or such other manner as the court, in its discretion, may deem just and reasonable,
including electronic service. Id.
171. See, e.g., ALA. R. CIV. P. 4.3(d)(1) (“reasonable diligence”); ALASKA R. CIV. P. 4(e)(1)
(“diligent inquiry”); ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 4.1(k), (l)(1)(A)(i) (“reasonably diligent efforts”); COLO. R. CIV.
P. 4(f) (“due diligence”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 49.041(1) (West 2018) (“diligent search and inquiry”);
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-316(A)(1)(b) (2018) (“diligence”).
172. Supra note 157 and 160; see also ALA. R. CIV. P. 4.3(d)(1) (requiring that the petitioner file
an affidavit to seek service by publication); infra Section IV.C.
173. Supra note 14 and accompanying text.
174. HENRY & PLAYER, supra note 14.
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little incentive to doggedly locate and personally serve a batterer.”175 The
brief timeframe for service in domestic violence cases often means that
law enforcement officers do not make multiple service attempts.176 Many
counties still utilize rudimentary methods for transferring protection order
paperwork to police departments,177 such as using mail, couriers, or pickup boxes from which deputies retrieve service packets, as opposed to
instantaneous email or electronic delivery. Officers typically fail to
communicate with petitioners about their efforts at achieving service.178
A police sergeant overseeing a two-detective team charged with serving
domestic violence petitions and orders in a major metropolitan area
identifies challenges: “There are people who can’t be found, don’t want
to be found, they’re hiding in the bathroom, moved to
Minnesota . . . . Police cannot knock down a door to serve an
order . . . there is a limit.”179
Through pragmatic measures, law enforcement can better fulfill the
federal requirement for law enforcement to effectuate service in domestic
violence cases. Law enforcement and courts can improve processes so that
officers timely receive pleadings and summons for service, immediately
begin efforts at service, make multiple service attempts, and communicate
with petitioners about service.
In contrast to pro se litigants’ reliance on law enforcement for service,
higher-resourced individuals and their attorneys often utilize detectives or
private process servers to accomplish personal service. Whereas police
and sheriffs attempting service will generally only make one service
attempt, private services can be employed to conduct stakeouts and
attempt service at multiple locations multiple times. These private agents
appear in plainclothes, rather than in uniform, and do not drive police cars,
making it more likely that the respondent will answer the door.180
Resources and counsel do not guarantee service, however, especially


175. Mary Schouvieller, Leaping Without Looking: Chapter 142’s Impact on Ex Parte Protection
Orders and the Movement Against Domestic Violence in Minnesota, 14 LAW & INEQ. 593, 630 (1996).
176. Id.
177. Rhor, supra note 18.
178. In my experience litigating domestic violence cases in six states over nearly two decades, law
enforcement rarely communicates with petitioners about service. Instead, law enforcement commonly
instructs petitioners and counsel to check with the court about whether a proof of service has been filed.
179. Singer, supra note 16.
180. These observations are based on my experience litigating domestic violence cases in six
jurisdictions over nearly two decades.
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when respondents successfully evade service.181 One example of a highly
visible individual with resources whose case was dismissed for lack of
service is former Miss USA and Real Housewives of Atlanta reality
television star Kenya Moore, whose case against her ex-boyfriend was
dismissed even as he persisted in harassing her.182
D.

Court Rules Mandating Case Dismissal for Lack of Service

Currently, if a petitioner is unable to personally serve the respondent,
judges may reissue the TPO; however, some counties’ local rules require
that petitions be dismissed after one, two, or three hearing dates by which
service has not been achieved, even though the survivor still needs
protection.183 Even in counties where no such local rule exists, judges
commonly dismiss civil protection order cases after only two TPO
reissuances if the respondent has not been personally served,184 leaving
petitioners without remedy and instructing petitioners to re-file and restart
the entire process if the respondent reappears.
Dismissing domestic violence cases for lack of service and leaving
abuse survivors without protection is problematic and dangerous because
many abuse perpetrators intentionally evade service or are difficult or
impossible to find, yet continue stalking, threatening, and abusing
petitioners and present ongoing danger to the parties’ children. Even when
a domestic violence order has not yet been personally served on the
respondent, it provides important safety protections that schools,
workplaces, and others observe—thereby preventing respondents from
abducting children from daycares and schools and from coming into
protected locations, such as the petitioner’s workplace.


181. See infra notes 191–196 and accompanying text, detailing two client examples for which my
Domestic Violence Clinic spent over $4,000 in one case and over $2,000 in another case on private
investigators and process servers to attempt to locate and serve respondents.
182. LIEBER & GALPERIN LLP, supra note 15.
183. Under California local court rules, in San Francisco and Alameda Counties, the court will
dismiss the case after three attempts at service; in Butte County, the case is dismissed after only one
attempt, and other counties, including San Mateo County, permit two attempts at personal service
before the court dismisses the case. See, e.g., BUTTE COUNTY R. 16.4 (“If a responding party fails to
appear at a hearing, the moving party must submit proof of timely service to the Court; otherwise, the
matter will be taken off calendar.”); SAN MATEO COUNTY R. 5.7(E) (presuming that the court shall
dismiss a case after two hearing dates without service).
184. Minute Orders of case examples are on file with the Author.
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Case Studies Illustrating Danger of Current Procedural Rules

Current notice and personal service requirements create additional
impediments in an already challenging legal process for domestic
violence victims seeking legal protection, including increased safety risks,
traumatic emotional and mental triggers, financial and time-related
constraints, and the inability to receive necessary court-ordered
protection. This Section explores the logistical, financial, and safetyrelated challenges of the procedural rules just discussed.
The service process itself often creates danger for victims and their
family members and friends who attempt to assist with service. Rebecca
Griego’s sister, Rachel Griego, recounted the difficulty of trying to locate
a man who was able to evade law enforcement’s service efforts while
continually threatening and stalking her sister. Jonathan had no place of
employment, had stolen from his roommates, was on the run, and used
pay-as-you-go phones so he could not be tracked.185 Given these factors,
the police were unable to locate and serve Jonathan.
Rachel Griego recalled, “In short, we were left to find him ourselves in
order to serve him, which, in and of itself, put our very lives in danger.”186
The Domestic Violence Unit judge suggested that the sisters post
information on Craigslist to help with their search, and told them, “Good
luck.”187 The judge expressed that because of the requirement for personal
service, there was nothing more the judge could do to protect Rebecca
from abuse.188 Jonathan murdered Rebecca the day before the next
scheduled court date on her protection order request.189
The personal service requirement often creates extreme delays in those
domestic violence cases that are not dismissed, all the while jeopardizing
safety.190 In one of my domestic violence clinic’s cases, we hired a private
process server to attempt service on a respondent in coordination with the
police.191 His roommate said he was not home, and the respondent fled
with the parties’ baby. The respondent, who had threatened to take their
baby and change her name, texted our client: “Lose this number.”192 He

185. Perry, supra note 7.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. H.R. Rep. 60-6357, Reg. Sess., at 3 (Wash. 2008); S.B. Rep. 60-6357, Reg. Sess., at 1 (Wash. 2008).
190. Schouvieller, supra note 175, at 630.
191. Court pleadings, referenced exhibits, and invoices totaling over $4,000 for private process
servers and private investigators are on file with the Author.
192. Exhibits are on file with the Author.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3363973

2019]

ACCESS TO SAFETY AND JUSTICE

367

spent the next seven months on the run with the infant, evading service
and police detection.193 Our clinic and client spent the entirety of that time
searching for our client’s baby, attempting to track the respondent through
welfare and food stamp payments and the baby’s medical records, and
returning to court every three weeks to seek an extension of the TPO.194
Finally, the respondent and child were found after I went on local news
with our client, and the mother and child were reunited.195
Nearly twenty months after our client first filed for a civil protection
order, after further court delays, the hearing occurred and she was awarded
her permanent order. Our clinic was determined to recover her baby and
spent more than $4,000 on private process servers and private
investigators alone, in addition to the hardships to our client of missed
work, transportation expense, and emotional trauma; the attorney and
student intern time; and the judicial and clerical resources.
The following example further illustrates entwined difficulties
attendant to mandating pre-TPO notice and personal service in domestic
violence cases, and how pre-TPO notice endangers survivors and their
children and makes achieving personal service more difficult by alerting
respondents to evade service.
We represented Karen, who had three young children with her exboyfriend, in her civil protection order and child support cases. Jason
viciously abused Karen during their seven-year relationship, including
beating her so severely that she had a miscarriage. When Karen first
sought representation, we learned that she had been unable to receive a
protective order in the past because she could not serve Jason. The judge
had dismissed her two prior filings and TPOs after two continuances, each
for lack of personal service,196 yet Jason kept threatening and abusing her,
and Karen feared he would take their children from school.
We felt compelled to help Karen and her children, aware that service
would be an issue. When we filed a new petition, the judge required us to
provide four-hour notice to Jason for the new TPO pursuant to Orange
County court rules, refusing to find “good cause” for waiving notice
despite Jason’s threat of child abduction; history of violence; criminal
record that included drug, gang, and weapon-related offenses; and prior
success evading service. Jason responded to our notice by texting that he

193. Pleadings and court orders are on file with the Author.
194. Court filings and orders are on file with the Author.
195. Authorities Believe Baby Girl Allegedly Abducted in 2013 Is Still in San Bernardino County, CBS
L.A. (Oct. 3, 2014, 11:04 PM), https://losangeles.cbslocal.com/2014/10/03/authorities-believe-baby-girlallegedly-abducted-in-2013-is-still-in-san-bernardino-county/ [https://perma.cc/W3L4-LAMA].
196. The court’s Minute Order is on file with the clinic.
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was not coming to court. The pre-TPO notice alerted Jason that we would
be searching for him for service.
Jason did not have stable housing or employment, so my students
undertook extensive efforts to locate him through social media, and we
were eventually able to have a private investigator serve Jason at a bar
after midnight. Following a default hearing at which Jason failed to
appear, the judge noted how brave Karen was for pursuing relief and said,
“I want you to know, you have the respect of the Court.” The protection
order then had to be personally served, which proved impossible for many
months.
The pre-TPO notice rule and personal service requirements together
cause abuse survivors anxiety and fear. Repeated court dates also
paradoxically provide opportunities to stalk petitioners, as abuse survivors
must keep returning to court at set dates and times. Across jurisdictions,
abuse survivors who are most vulnerable to high-level abuse are left to
navigate court processes and service attempts on their own and report
feeling fearful and at a loss.197
Part III will explain the legal basis for permitting alternative service for
domestic violence cases, and Part IV will address the problematic historic
reasons for the differential treatment of domestic violence cases before
Part V recommends remedies.
III. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE EXCEPTIONALISM AND DUE
PROCESS
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution protects a respondent’s right to notice, which is ensured
through service of process.198 Significantly, a petitioner also has a
constitutionally protected interest in having a hearing on the merits of his
or her claim “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”199 The
petitioner’s due process right of access to courts has received scant
attention in scholarship.200 Section III.A addresses the petitioner’s right
while noting that the respondent does not have a constitutionally protected
interest in avoiding claims or evading service of process. Section III.B
details the respondent’s rights and the evolving notice-giving standards
articulated by the Supreme Court.

197. See Perry, supra note 7; Rhor, supra note 18.
198. Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999).
199. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 437 (1982).
200. See John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to
a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524 (2005).
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The Petitioner’s Right to a Hearing

The Due Process Clause applies both to “defendants hoping to protect
their property” and to “plaintiffs attempting to redress grievances.”201
Despite this dual application, Judith Herman noted the longstanding lack
of attention to petitioners’ rights, writing, “The legal system is designed
to protect men from the superior power of the state but not to protect
women or children from the superior power of men. It therefore provides
strong guarantees for the rights of the accused but essentially no
guarantees for the rights of the victim.”202
The Due Process Clause requires that court rules allow access to a
hearing at a “meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”203 As the
Court in Mullane explained, once the state creates a remedy, it cannot
deprive the petitioner of a hearing on that claim without due process of
law.204 If procedural rules are so stringent as to prevent petitioners from
achieving service and having their cases heard, as commonly occurs in
domestic violence protection order cases, petitioners are denied the right
of access to the courts.
The Court in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.205 stated that rules must
not create an “unjustifiably high risk that meritorious claims will be
terminated,”206 but this is precisely what happens when domestic violence
petitions are dismissed for failure to personally serve the respondent. The
jurisdictions with rules that automatically terminate domestic violence
petitions for lack of service contravene the Due Process Clause, which
prevents rules from terminating a claim when the petitioner’s failure to
comply with the rules is “due to inability, and not to willfulness, bad faith,
or any fault” of the petitioner.207

201. Logan, 455 U.S. at 429.
202. HERMAN, supra note 118, at 72.
203. Logan, 445 U.S. at 437; Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
204. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314–15; see also Logan, 455 U.S. at 429 (“The Court traditionally has
held that the Due Process Clauses protect civil litigants who seek recourse in the courts, either as
defendants hoping to protect their property or as plaintiffs attempting to redress grievances.”); Boddie
v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380 (1971) (holding that, under the Due Process Clause, states cannot
limit the rights to adjudicatory procedures when doing so is “the equivalent of denying them an
opportunity to be heard upon their claimed right”).
205. 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
206. Id. at 434.
207. Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357
U.S. 197, 212 (1958).
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Significantly, respondents do not have a due process interest in
avoiding claims against them or evading service of process. Procedural
rules must instead protect all rights at stake, including both the
respondent’s and petitioner’s rights, and strike a reasonable balance in
doing so.
B.

The Respondent’s Notice Rights

A court must have both personal jurisdiction and proper service of
process to have power to rule on a dispute.208 Due process demands that
the respondent is given proper notice and the opportunity to be heard
before the court exercises jurisdiction.209 If the respondent does not
receive proper notice, the court’s power to adjudicate the matter is
imperfect, and its judgments are vulnerable to collateral attack.210
In many areas of the law, standards for notice-giving have developed
and evolved to ensure defendants have opportunities to participate in
proceedings, particularly as the “constitutionally permissible bases for
exercising jurisdiction over the defendant’s person or property have
expanded.”211 Namely, given technological advances and how people live
and interact, service of process via electronic means is often the most
expedient method of actually providing notice and ensuring justice.212
Service of process in domestic violence cases, however, has not evolved
with technology and with due process doctrine more generally.
1.

Evolving Notice-Giving Standards

Regarding the historical evolution of service of process, in Pennoyer v.
Neff 213 in 1877, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether the federal
Constitution requires particular methods of service and found personal
service to be the most preferable means, but permitted constructive
service in limited settings, such as permitting service by publication for
unreachable in-state defendants.214 During the past century, due process

208. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.
209. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.
210. Smith v. United States, 403 F.2d 448 (7th Cir. 1968); see also JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL.,
CIVIL PROCEDURE 173–74 (5th ed. 2015).
211. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 210, at 174; cf. Chaplin v. Superior Court, 253 P. 954 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1927) (finding notice not satisfied even when the defendant had knowledge of the lawsuit,
evaded service, and had the lawsuit brought to his attention through media publicity and personal
correspondence).
212. Infra notes 387–389 and accompanying text.
213. 95 U.S. 714, 729 (1877).
214. Id. at 729, 733–34.
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doctrine has evolved from requiring actual notice to permitting methods
that instead provide a likelihood that service will give notice. For
example, forty years after Pennoyer, the Court in McDonald v. Mabee215
explicitly authorized other service methods, such as leaving notice with
the defendant’s co-resident at their home.216
The current general standard for notice, declared by the Court in
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., is “notice reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections.”217 The Court expanded methods of service consistent with the
“reasonably calculated” standard articulated in Mullane218 and has since
affirmed that the Constitution requires service methods that are likely to
achieve actual notice, regardless of whether they in fact provide notice.219
The Court took into account practical difficulties when it declared: “A
construction of the Due Process Clause which would place impossible or
impractical obstacles in the way could not be justified. Against this
interest of the State we must balance the individual interest sought to be
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”220
Courts encourage flexibility concerning the mandate of reasonableness
under the circumstances of the case,221 recognizing that the notice and
opportunity for hearing should be “appropriate to the nature of the
case.”222 The U.S. Supreme Court has also maintained that due process

215. 243 U.S. 90, 92 (1917).
216. Id. (“To dispense with personal service the substitute that is most likely to reach the defendant
is the least that ought to be required if substantial justice is to be done.”).
217. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314–15 (1950) (permitting service
by mail in the case in question concerning common-trust fund proceedings).
218. Id. at 315.
219. See, e.g., Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 168 (2002) (affirming the Mullane
standard for the sufficiency of notice); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694,
705, (1988) (identifying personal service or substituted service as acceptable means of serving a
foreign party); Polansky v. Richardson, 351 F. Supp. 1066, 1069 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (explaining that
actual receipt of process is not the test for due process, instead it is whether “reasonable steps had
been taken to give [the adverse party] notice” (alteration in original)). Note also that parties can
knowingly and voluntarily waive notice, such as through waiver by contract (in the absence of
substantially unequal bargaining power between the parties or a contract of adhesion). See, e.g., D.
H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972) (finding that due process is not violated by the
inclusion of a cognovits clause in a promissory note); Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S.
311 (1964) (permitting service of process upon a party’s designated agent).
220. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313–14.
221. See id. at 314–15.
222. In re Jesusa V., 85 P.3d 2, 9 (Cal. 2004).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3363973

372

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:333

requirements must be flexible and particular to the situation.223 Although
personal service guarantees actual notice of the pendency of a legal action,
“less rigorous notice procedures have enjoyed substantial acceptance
throughout our legal history.”224 Furthermore, outside of domestic
violence contexts, when the defendant has actual knowledge of the case
even though formal notice has not been perfected, many courts accept this
knowledge as sufficient.225
2.

Alternative Service Options Across Other Areas of Law

The U.S. Supreme Court and lower courts have acknowledged the
prevalence of alternate methods of service. Beyond traditional personal
service, generally applicable state and federal civil procedure statutes
commonly provide for “substituted” or “constructive” service, such as by
mailing notice to the defendant, leaving notice at the defendant’s home,
electronic delivery, posting notice, or publishing notice in a newspaper in
the manner prescribed by statute. In federal court matters, for example,
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4(e)(2)(B) authorizes leaving process at
the defendant’s usual place of abode.226 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 4(d) authorizes first-class mail as a substitute for personal service
and even encourages its use to save the expense of personal service.227
Procedural rules and courts permit various methods of service of
process across multiple contexts.228 For example, service by certified mail

223. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”); Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v.
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) (“Due process, unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception
with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.” (internal quotations omitted)).
224. Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 449 (1982).
225. Nowell v. Nowell, 384 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1967); Clemones v. Ala. Power Co., 250 F. Supp.
433 (N.D. Ga. 1966); cf. Md. State Firemen’s Ass’n v. Chaves, 166 F.R.D. 353 (D. Md. 1996);
Chilcote v. Shertzer, 372 F. Supp. 86 (E.D. Wis. 1974); Espindola v. Nunez, 245 Cal. Rptr. 596 (Ct.
App. 1988) (In a civil suit for negligence, breach of contract, fraud, and conspiracy, service was proper
where the process server attempted three times to serve the defendant personally at his home and then,
on the fourth try, left copies with the defendant’s wife, a codefendant in the action. The court focuses
on legislative intent, which provides for a liberal reading of the due diligence requirement.).
226. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e)(2)(B); see, e.g., Karlsson v. Rabinowitz, 318 F.2d 666 (4th Cir. 1963)
(determining that service delivered to the defendant’s wife in Maryland was proper even though the
husband-defendant had moved to Arizona with no intent to return to Maryland).
227. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d).
228. See, e.g., Lewis v. Madej, No. 15cv2676, 2015 WL 6442255 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2015)
(trademark infringement case permitting substituted service); Bein v. Brechtel-Jochim Grp, Inc., 8
Cal. Rptr. 2d 351 (Ct. App. 1992) (in a corporate breach of contract action, permitting service to the
gate guard for defendants who lived in a gated community).
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is sufficient for license revocation229 and mechanic’s liens,230 to
designated licensing agencies,231 and in general civil suits.232 Service by
posting a summons and complaint on the residence in dispute is
acceptable in unlawful detainer cases for a landlord to have “a summary,
expeditious way of getting back his property when a tenant fails to pay
the rent or refuses to vacate the premises at the end of his tenancy.”233
Service by publication suffices for personal injury cases234 and to
terminate parental rights.235 In general, federal requirements for service
on businesses are broad and allow for multiple employees to receive
documents to satisfy the service requirement236 or for the Secretary of
State to receive service.237 Service abroad on a foreign business entity can
be accomplished in every method under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(h) other than personal delivery.238
Each jurisdiction imposes its own statutory requirements for service of
process that extend beyond the minimum requirement of due process.
Some state statutes include catch-all provisions for alternate service

229. See, e.g., McIntee v. State Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 279 N.W.2d 817, 820 (Minn. 1979) (holding that
delivery of a license revocation notice via certified mail to a respondent’s postbox of five years was
sufficient to constitute “constructive delivery” of notice despite respondent’s failure to pick up his mail).
230. See, e.g., Har-Ned Lumber Co. v. Amagineers, Inc., 436 N.W.2d 811, 814–15 (Minn. Ct. App.
1989) (concluding that service of a mechanic’s lien statement via certified mail was timely despite
recipient’s failure to respond to the notice).
231. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 10151.5 (West 2018) (authorizing nonresident real estate licensees
to be served through the Bureau of Real Estate).
232. D.C. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(3)–(4) (permitting service by registered or certified mail in civil cases);
see also Ellard v. Conway, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399 (Ct. App. 2001) (providing an example of a fraud
action permitting service by mail).
233. Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Ham, 156 Cal. Rptr. 3d 839, 899 (Ct.
App. 2013) (stating that the expeditious recovery of real property “is not served by a protracted inquiry
into all sources of information regarding the tenant’s location before posting and mailing at the one
address of which the landlord is certain”); Nork v. Pac. Coast Med. Enters., Inc., 140 Cal. Rptr. 734
(Ct. App. 1977).
234. See, e.g., Elliott v. Franklin, No. CX-92-1968, 1993 WL 129633, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr.
27, 1993) (finding service by publication in a personal injury case adequate when a respondent
purposely avoided service pursuant to MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.04).
235. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26 (West 2018).
236. An employee capable of receiving service need only have the authority and responsibility to
render it likely he or she will know what to do with the papers received to be deemed a “managing or
general agent” for the purposes of Rule 4(h)(1)(B). Baade v. Price, 175 F.R.D. 403, 405 (D.D.C.
1997) (holding that the person served must have some measure of discretion in operating some phase
of defendant’s business or in management of a given office); Montclair Elecs., Inc. v. Electra/Midland
Corp., 326 F. Supp. 839, 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
237. See, e.g., TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 17.026 (West 2018); TEX. R. CIV. P. 103.
238. Freedom Watch, Inc. v. OPEC, 766 F.3d 74 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (antitrust case).
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through electronic service239 and other means that are increasingly
relevant based on advances in technology and the evolving ways in which
people live and communicate. For example, during the past two decades,
electronic service has been permitted in trademark infringement,240
bankruptcy,241 class action securities fraud,242 international business
affairs,243 and general domestic business cases.244 An emerging trend in
New York, the District of Columbia, and some other jurisdictions permits
email and Facebook service in civil cases, including family law cases,
when traditional service proves impracticable and the party also attempts
service by mail upon the last known address.245 Reported cases involving
this method of service include divorce246 and international child custody
matters.247


239. See, e.g., CAL. R. OF CT. 2.251(a) (“When a document may be served by mail, express mail,
overnight delivery, or fax transmission, the document may be served electronically under Code of
Civil Procedure section 1010.6 and the rules in this chapter.”).
240. Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2002).
241. In re Int’l Telemedia Assocs., 245 B.R. 713 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2000); In re Xacur, 216 B.R.
187 (Bankr. S. D. Tex. 1997) (permitting service via email and posting the text of the complaint on a
web page).
242. Greebel v. FTP Software, 939 F. Supp. 57 (D. Mass. 1996).
243. AngioDynamics, Inc. v. Biolitec AG, 780 F.3d 420, 428–29 (1st Cir. 2015) (approving service
on “elusive international” defendant’s counsel); Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1013, 1016 (determining
email service to be sufficient with both the Constitution and Rule 4(f)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure where the defendant had structured its business so that it could only be reached by email);
In re Int’l Telemedia Assocs., 245 B.R. at 715–18 (where an international defendant-debtor had
refused to provide a permanent address, but did provide a permanent facsimile number and email
address, the court ordered service to be effected by facsimile, email, and regular mail to the
defendant’s last known address).
244. Snyder v. Alternate Energy Inc., 857 N.Y.S.2d 442, 443–44 (Civ. Ct. 2008) (finding service
by email appropriate when conventional service was impracticable).
245. Supra notes 30–31; see, e.g., D.C. SUPER. CT. DOM. VIO. R. 5(a)(3) (permitting judges to allow
multiple forms of alternative service).
246. Hollow v. Hollow, 747 N.Y.S.2d 704, 706–08 (Sup. Ct. 2002) (relying on Rio Props., 284
F.3d 1007 and In re Int’l Telemedia Assocs., 245 B.R. 713, and finding that email service of process
satisfies the requirement set forth in Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306
(1950)). In Hollow, the first case to authorize e-service under rule 308(5) of the New York Civil
Practice Law and Rules, email service was acceptable in a divorce case when sent to a defendant that
had been living in Saudi Arabia for two years and had only communicated with the plaintiff through
email, and other methods of service were impracticable. The court allowed e-service, in combination
with service through international registered and standard mail. Hollow, 747 N.Y.S.2d at 706–08.
247. Ferrarese v. Shaw, 164 F. Supp. 3d 361, 364, 367–68 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (in international
custody and child abduction case, allowing service by email and Facebook, provided petitioner also
effected service by certified mail, on defendant’s last known address, and on defendant’s sister).
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Due Process for Domestic Violence

Because protection orders place restrictions on the respondent’s
actions—such as prohibiting the respondent from communicating with or
being near the petitioner and parties’ children,248 ordering the respondent
to vacate a shared residence,249 and awarding temporary child custody and
financial support250—questions arise about whether alternative service
sufficiently protects respondents’ due process rights.
Although jurisdictions generally require personal service for domestic
violence cases, due process does not demand personal service. Section 1
examines how service of process methods already prescribed in codes of
civil procedure, which are designed to give reasonable notice of an action
to the respondent, fulfill due process requirements in the domestic
violence context. Section III.C.1 applies the Mathews v. Eldridge251
factors,252 which require consideration of the domestic violence context,
balance of harms, and the governmental interest in providing protection
from abuse. Notably, respondents can challenge domestic violence
protection orders by motioning the court to modify or vacate orders, so a
respondent who feels unfairly or unduly burdened by an order issued
following alternative service can still petition the court. Finally,
Section III.C.2 addresses questions of enforcement and procedural justice.
1.

Mathews v. Eldridge Analysis

Due process requirements strive to ensure the respondent has actual
notice of the domestic violence protection order hearing and the
opportunity to appear in court. Even though personal service is preferable,
the due process adequacy of other forms of notice for domestic violence
protection order cases is a separate inquiry and can be evaluated under the
Mathews factors.253

248. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-1005 (2019) (listing forms of relief); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 26.50.060 (2018) (same).
249. See Margaret E. Johnson, A Home with Dignity: Domestic Violence and Property Rights, 2014
BYU L. REV. 1 (2014).
250. Stoever, supra note 74, at 364–65 (2011) (identifying that some protection order statutes lack
financial relief, and discussing judicial reluctance to address financial remedies, even when statutorily
enumerated, in protection order cases).
251. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
252. Id. at 321.
253. Id.
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In Mathews v. Eldridge, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether
individuals have a statutorily granted property right in Social Security
benefits.254 The Court held that terminating such benefits implicates due
process but does not require a pre-termination hearing.255 In determining
the amount of process due, the Court set forth three factors to be weighed:
(1) the private interests affected; (2) the procedural safeguards provided,
specifically considering the risk of erroneous deprivation resulting from
the procedures and the probable value of additional safeguards; and
(3) the government’s interest.256
Across jurisdictions, the entry of a protection order following
alternative service occurs only when the respondent has been unable to be
located for personal service.257 Thus, if a respondent actively seeks
custody or visitation of a child, one would expect to be able to locate the
respondent. Similarly, concern about a respondent being ordered to vacate
his or her residence without receiving notice is also misplaced, as the
petitioner would effectuate personal service on a respondent residing in a
known residence who is not evading service. A respondent’s significant
interest in having custody of his or her child, in remaining in the shared
residence, or in not having a civil protection order issued against him or
her is therefore unlikely to be infringed upon; even if it were however,
this interest does not outweigh the value of the safeguards provided and
the government’s interest.
Multiple procedural safeguards minimize the risk of erroneous
deprivation. First, orders are issued only upon a petitioner’s sworn and
factually specific affidavit and/or testimony and only after a judicial
officer determines that domestic abuse has occurred under the statutory
definition.258 Before a judge can issue a TPO or Civil Protection Order, a
judge must make statutory findings that the legal standards are satisfied.259
Second, petitioners must generally make diligent efforts at personal
service before alternative service is permitted, with actual notice being the

254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. See supra Part II, detailing how personal service is required before alternative methods may
be utilized in domestic violence cases.
258. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 6200–6460 (West 2018) (requiring courts to find “an act or acts
of abuse” before issuing a protective order); D.C. CODE § 16-1005(c) (2019) (requiring courts to find
good cause to believe a respondent committed or threatened to commit a criminal offense against the
petitioner before entering relief).
259. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-1004(b)(1) (2019) (requiring courts to determine that the safety or welfare
of the petitioner or petitioner’s household member are immediately endangered before issuing a TPO).
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goal.260 Third, the respondent can make a motion to modify or vacate the
order261; the “permanent” order is not truly permanent, as aggrieved
respondents can petition the court to be heard and receive relief. Finally,
courts must tailor the injunctive relief in civil protection orders to the
case.262
The federal government and each state have expressed strong interests
in protecting survivors of domestic violence and in acting promptly to
remedy the immediate and present dangers of such abuse. Indeed, the
government “has an extraordinary interest in a society free from violence,
especially where vulnerable persons are at risk.”263 States enacted
domestic violence protection order laws to “prevent violence”264 and
further their “strong policy against domestic violence.”265 Moreover,
legislative history expresses the strong legislative intent that these
protective laws be “broadly construed” to reduce violence.266 Courts have
also noted the “vulnerability of the targeted population (largely
unrepresented women and their minor children).”267 Given the safety
issues at stake and the procedural safeguards the law affords, issuing a
civil protection order following alternative service would sufficiently
protect an alleged abusive partner’s right to due process.
To safeguard both petitioners’ and respondents’ right to due process in
the domestic violence realm, orders have been overturned when judges
issued mutual protection orders without underlying allegations of
abuse.268 During the 1990s and 2000s, many judges wrongfully issued
protection orders against both the petitioner and respondent even though

260. Supra note 171 and accompanying text.
261. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01(11)(a) (2018) (“Upon application, notice to all parties, and hearing,
the court may modify the terms of an existing order for protection.”); see also Mathews, 424 U.S. 319
(discussing post-deprivation procedures to rectify an erroneous deprivation).
262. See generally Stoever, supra note 45 (discussing the limited duration of civil protection orders).
263. Baker v. Baker, 494 N.W.2d 282, 288 (Minn. 1992) (“[I]nasmuch as the statute requires an
allegation of an ‘immediate and present danger of domestic abuse,’ there can be no argument that a special
need for prompt action is shown.” (quoting MINN. STAT. § 518B.01(7)(a)) (internal citations omitted)).
264. Holeman v. White, 292 P.3d 65, 68 (Okla. Civ. App. 2012) (“The Protection from Domestic
Abuse Act serves a vital purpose, to prevent violence.”).
265. Cesare v. Cesare, 713 A.2d 390, 393 (N.J. 1998).
266. In re Marriage of Nadkarni, 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 723, 734 (Ct. App. 2009) (identifying that “the
Legislature intended that the DVPA [Domestic Violence Prevention Act] be broadly construed in
order to accomplish the purpose of the DVPA” of reducing domestic violence).
267. Id. at 735 (citing Gonzalez v. Munoz, 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 317, 324 (Ct. App. 2007)).
268. Isidora M. v. Silvino M., 190 Cal. Rptr. 3d 502 (Ct. App. 2015) (reversing the issuance of a
mutual civil protection order when only one party had sought an order against the other and allegations
had not been filed to provide notice).
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no allegations of abuse had been filed and the judges had not made
findings of abuse committed by the petitioner.269 The judges reasoned that
by prohibiting contact by either party, the parties would fully separate and
the judicial orders would more effectively prevent future contact and
violence. Without notice of allegations and findings of facts amounting to
abuse under the domestic violence statutes, much less any claim of
domestic violence, such orders violated due process. These appellate
cases demonstrate that findings of facts and substantiated claims of abuse
are necessary for protection orders to stand, relieving concern that
frivolous or deceitful protection orders would exist if service were less of
a barrier.
2.

Enforcement and Procedural Justice

Regarding enforcement, personal service more readily guarantees
enforcement of a domestic violence order because it ensures that the
respondent has actual notice of the allegations and court proceeding and
has been given the opportunity to appear in court to be heard. Naturally,
orders are more easily enforced when notice is not of concern; without
actual knowledge of protection order provisions, respondents can
collaterally attack alleged violations on grounds that they did not know
that their conduct was prohibited by the order.
However, petitioners would often be able to prove actual notice through
evidence other than proof of personal service, such as text messages,
social media postings, or voicemails from the respondent that reference
the protection order. Furthermore, enabling courts to issue protection
orders that can later be personally served when the respondent reappears
is preferable to leaving an abuse survivor without protection. Even if the
respondent is not actually aware of the order, schools, workplaces, and
others can still enforce protection orders to prevent violence and child
abduction.
From a procedural justice perspective, ensuring actual notice is
preferable so that the respondent may present his or her case in court and
feel heard, which increases compliance with court orders.270 Scholars have
also noted that “[m]aking an abuser face a judge reinforces the idea that


269. Kit Kinports & Karla Fischer, Orders of Protection in Domestic Violence Cases: An Empirical
Assessment of the Impact of the Reform Statutes, 2 TX. J. WOMEN & L. 163, 218 (1992).
270. Deborah Epstein, Procedural Justice: Tempering the State’s Response to Domestic Violence,
43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1843, 1868–69, 1876–79 & nn.113–17 (2002).
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domestic abuse is unacceptable.”271 Furthermore, “[i]f early and critical
opportunities to deter and inform alleged abusers are not utilized, a
batterer will be more likely to consider the protection order against him a
worthless piece of paper or a violation of his right to due process.”272
Rather than defaulting to the broader state civil procedure codes, civil
protection order remedies often have more stringent procedural rules
imposed through family code provisions273 or procedural rules governing
domestic violence courts.274 But in the domestic violence context, given
the adequacy of alternative methods of service, the survivor’s need for
safety-related legal protection, and the respondent’s ability to petition the
court to vacate a protection order, alternative service protects due process
of both parties.
IV. EXPLAINING DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE
Denial of legal protection for failure to achieve service contravenes the
protective intent of domestic violence legislation, courts’ recognition of
the “vulnerability of the targeted population (largely unrepresented
women and their minor children),”275 and the readily obtainable option of
alternative service in other areas of law. Part IV seeks to understand why
jurisdictions impose heightened service requirements for domestic
violence remedies. Section IV.A describes how procedural rules replicate
and reinforce the state’s historic refusal to respond to domestic violence.
Section IV.B reveals how subordination and experiences of violence are
linked by race, class, and gender; amasses research showing that most
abuse survivors seeking court protection are low-income women and are
disproportionately women of color; and interrogates how the law works
to erect barriers to their protection. Section IV.C explores societal
reluctance to believe abuse survivors, which also results in barriers to
accessing legal protection.

271. Schouvieller, supra note 175, at 609–10. Minnesota’s weighing between interests to focus on
protecting abuse survivors is significant because the state ultimately created a one-step, self-finalizing
ex parte protection order. Id. This does not exist in other states.
272. Id. at 610.
273. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 243 (West 2018).
274. See, e.g., D.C. SUPER. CT. DOM. VIOL. R. 5(a)(3).
275. In re Marriage of Nadkarni, 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 723, 735 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing Gonzalez v.
Munoz, 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 317, 324 (Ct. App. 2007)).
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Historic Acceptance of Domestic Violence

The historical acceptance of spousal abuse and the context in which
domestic violence laws evolved inform the current differential treatment
of civil protection orders. Laws in the United States historically excluded
marital relations from state oversight and intervention, with the family
deemed a protected “private sphere”276 that was exempt from legal
scrutiny, even when victimized individuals sought help.277
At common law, a husband had the “right of chastisement” over his
wife278 and the duty to “make the wife behave herself” through any means
necessary, including through thrashing her.279 He could not be subject to
prosecution unless he inflicted permanent damage on his wife.280 A wife’s
identity was subsumed in her husband’s, thus preventing her from suing
him.281 Marriage was considered sacred and permanent, regardless of the
violence one spouse inflicted upon the other, with courts applying theories
of family privacy to shield abusive spouses from prosecution.282 For

276. Morgan L. Woolley, Marital Rape: A Unique Blend of Domestic Violence and Non-Marital
Rape Issues, 18 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 269, 272, 275 (2007) (“The problem is that law enforcement
and the courts withhold protection when it is most critically needed out of respect for family
privacy.”); see State v. Edens, 95 N.C. 693 (1886) (deeming the family private and exempt from legal
scrutiny); State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. 453, 455 (1868) (holding that the law recognizes family
government as complete in itself, and will not “invade the domestic forum, or go behind the curtain”
in the absence of permanent injury).
277. See Edens, 95 N.C. at 697 (“We are not disposed . . . to break in needlessly upon that oneness
of husband and wife, which is the fundamental and cherished maxim of the common law . . . .”).
278. Blackstone stated that the husband has the right to restrain the wife “by domestic chastisement,
in the same moderation that a man is allowed to correct his apprentice or children.” 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *444.
279. State v. Black, 60 N.C. 267 (1864) (holding that “[a] husband is responsible for the acts of his
wife” thus permitting the husband to thrash her, if necessary to that end).
280. See Edens, 95 N.C. at 695–96 (holding that a man could “assault and batter[]” his wife if he
inflicted no permanent injury upon her, and also that a husband could “wanton[ly] and malicious[ly]”
slander the good name of his wife with impunity); Rhodes, 61 N.C. at 455–56 (holding that the law
recognizes family government “as complete in itself,” and will not “invade the domestic forum, or go
behind the curtain” in the absence of permanent injury); State v. Hussey, 44 N.C. 123, 126 (1852)
(finding that a wife is not a competent witness against her husband to prove battery that does not
inflict permanent damage); Siegel, supra note 45, at 2118 (“The Anglo-American common law
originally provided that a husband, as master of his household, could subject his wife to corporal
punishment or ‘chastisement’ so long as he did not inflict permanent injury upon her.” (citation
omitted)).
281. See, e.g., Edens, 95 N.C. at 697 (noting that a woman cannot maintain an action against her
husband due to her legal status upon marriage and describing the oneness of husband and wife as the
“fundamental and cherished maxim of the common law”).
282. Id. (noting that the law regards marriage as permanent and sacred and “leaves temporary
differences and wrongs which one may do to the other to the corrective hands of time and reflection”).
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example, in the 1868 case of State v. Rhodes,283 the North Carolina
Supreme Court refused to prosecute a husband for repeatedly whipping
his wife, stating, “[w]e will not inflict upon society the greater evil of
raising the curtain upon domestic privacy, to punish the lesser evil of
trifling violence.”284 Even after women were legally permitted to sue in
their own names, the law granted interspousal immunity from tort claims
to preserve the “tranquility of family relations.”285
Professor Reva Siegel coined the phrase “preservation through
transformation” to refer to legal change that gives the appearance of
correcting a wrong while, in fact, perpetuating the status quo.286 The term
aptly applies to domestic violence. After the law formally changed to
repudiate domestic assault, courts granted immunity from prosecution to
avoid disrupting family harmony and to protect the private sanctuary of
the home.287 Likewise, the law traditionally provided immunity from
marital rape charges and still provides differential protection and
application.288 Violent crimes committed by strangers garner significantly
more resources and attention than crimes committed against intimates,289
and stranger violence is more likely to lead to arrests and convictions than
identical crimes perpetrated against intimate partners or family
members.290

283. 61 N.C. 453 (1868).
284. Rhodes, 61 N.C. at 458–59 (observing that prosecution in middle-class families would be
“harassing to them, or injurious to society,” and that judicial reach into upper-class households would
bring “disgrace” and “ruin”).
285. See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 617–18 (1910) (considering the District of
Columbia’s Married Women’s Property Act, invoking marital privacy rationale for interspousal tort
immunity, and noting that such suits would “open the doors of the courts to accusations of all sorts of
one spouse against the other, and bring into public notice complaints for assault, slander and libel”);
Perkins v. Perkins, 62 Barb. 531, 535 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1872) (finding that allowing a cause of action
between spouses would “overwhelm” the courts and allow “the parties to a marriage contract to sue
each other for every fireside controversy”).
286. Siegel, supra note 45, at 2119, 2166, 2169–70.
287. Id. at 2120 (noting that immunities were granted by economic status to the benefit of middleand upper-class men).
288. Lisa R. Eskow, The Ultimate Weapon?: Demythologizing Spousal Rape and
Reconceptualizing Its Prosecution, 48 STAN. L. REV. 677, 682 (1996) (noting that at least thirteen
states continue to “offer preferential or disparate treatment to perpetrators of spousal sexual assault”);
Jaye Sitton, Old Wine in New Bottles: The “Marital” Rape Allowance, 72 N.C. L. REV. 261, 277
(1993) (“The marital rape exemption went largely unchallenged from the time of Matthew Hale until
the late 1970s.”).
289. Carissa Hessick, Violence Between Lovers, Strangers, and Friends, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 343,
344–45 (2007).
290. Id. at 345–46, 352–53.
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Preservation Through Transformation

In the early 1900s, as laws and legal systems developed, states created
family and juvenile courts to address criminal acts committed against
spouses and children outside of criminal courts.291 These family courts
prioritized family unity, encouraged reconciliation, and kept family
violence private, even when victimized individuals sought criminal
recourse.292 Law enforcement manuals instructed officers to delay
responding to domestic violence calls, have the abuse perpetrator walk
around the block, and otherwise mediate situations.293 Arrest and
prosecution for domestic violence remained exceedingly rare.294 As the
legal treatment of domestic violence shifted from marital duty and
prerogative to marital privacy, change was merely in structure and
rationale, and domestic violence largely remained socially and legally
condoned.295
Before the 1970s, the only civil remedy available for domestic violence
was a protection order issued through a divorce.296 Prior to the no-fault
divorce revolution that began in the 1970s, divorce required fault-based
grounds, fees, and extensive proceedings necessitating attorneys.297
Emergency ex parte orders in divorce required proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, and violations were only penalized as civil contempt, which

291. ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF SOCIAL POLICY AGAINST FAMILY
VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 126 (1987).
292. Id. at 137–38. See Camille Carey, Correcting Myopia in Domestic Violence Advocacy:
Moving Forward in Lawyering and Law School Clinics, 21 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 220, 226–27
(2011) (identifying how early family courts prevented domestic abuse from being recognized as a
public issue); Siegel, supra note 45, at 2118 (describing the treatment of wife battering in the AngloAmerican common law).
293. Lisa Goodman & Deborah Epstein, Refocusing on Women: A New Direction for Policy and
Research on Intimate Partner Violence, 20 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 479, 480 (2005) [hereinafter
Goodman & Epstein, Refocusing on Women].
294. See Fajardo v. County of Los Angeles, 179 F.3d 698 (9th Cir. 1999) (regarding an equal
protection claim against the sheriff and county under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the county had a
policy or custom that discriminated against domestic violence victims by giving lower priority to their
9-1-1 calls than to 9-1-1 non-domestic violence calls); Thurman v. Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D.
Conn. 1984) (finding that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause was violated by a
police department that routinely provided less protection to domestic violence victims than to victims
of stranger violence).
295. See Siegel, supra note 45, at 2169–70 (“The regulation of marital violence was thus translated
into the language of companionate marriage prevailing during the industrial era.”).
296. See Tarr, supra note 122, at 161 (“In order to get an injunction [preventing domestic violence],
the woman had to bring a lawsuit, which, in most cases, meant a divorce proceeding.”).
297. See Laurence M. Friedman, Divorce: The “Silent Revolution”, in FAMILY IN TRANSITION 203
(15th ed., Arlene S. Skolnick & Jerome H. Skolnick eds., 2009).
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generally meant a verbal reprimand.298 Permitting protection orders only
via divorce proved to be sorely inadequate given the lengthy nature of
divorce proceedings, the assumption that married petitioners wished to
divorce, the exclusion of unmarried victims from court protection, and the
lack of enforcement. A new legal remedy was needed.
During the 1960s and 1970s, battered-women’s activists and scholars
sought to transform domestic violence from a private matter into a public
one by creating legal mechanisms to enhance abuse survivors’ safety and
independence.299 The first domestic violence protection order legislation
was passed in 1970,300 with advocates intending for this autonomyenhancing injunctive relief to “radically alter the balance of power
between abusers and their victims”301 and enable survivors to invoke
protections of the criminal justice system.302 By 1993, all fifty states and
the District of Columbia had enacted protection order statutes.303
As with many legal issues related to family formation and dissolution,
state law largely governs protection orders and thus varies by state.304 As
states enacted domestic violence protection order statutes to protect
domestic violence survivors and their children from further danger, each
state determined how to define domestic violence and the types of
relationships covered, relief available, duration of orders, and rules
governing domestic violence remedies.305
In light of the deeply entrenched societal and legal acceptance of
domestic violence, protection order laws provided significant remedies
that were previously unavailable. Heightened standards for domestic

298. Tarr, supra note 122, at 161.
299. Goodman & Epstein, Refocusing on Women, supra note 293, at 480.
300. Tamara L. Kuennen, “No-Drop” Civil Protection Orders: Exploring the Bounds of Judicial
Intervention in the Lives of Domestic Violence Victims, 16 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 39, 48 (2007).
301. David M. Jaros, Unfettered Discretion: Criminal Orders of Protection and Their Impact on
Parent Defendants, 85 IND. L.J. 1445, 1451 (2010); see also Barbara J. Hart, State Codes on Domestic
Violence: Analysis, Commentary and Recommendations, 43 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 3, 23 (1992).
302. See Tarr, supra note 122, at 159.
303. LISA A. GOODMAN & DEBORAH EPSTEIN, LISTENING TO BATTERED WOMEN 33 (2008).
304. The U.S. Supreme Court has frequently proclaimed that family law is a matter of state law.
See, e.g., Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 167 (1899) (“[T]he whole subject of domestic relations of
husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the State, and not to the laws of the United
States.”). But see 18 U.S.C. § 228 (2018) (federal law regarding failure to pay child support
obligations); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (legalizing same-sex
marriage across the United States); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down all state laws
banning interracial marriage).
305. Each state has its own statutorily based civil and criminal remedies for domestic violence. For
forms of relief, see supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text.
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violence relief, however, prevent survivors from accessing such relief and
preserve existing gender hierarchies.306 As another example of differential
protection concerning domestic violence, short-term statutory injunctions
against domestic violence problematically give the appearance of
ostensibly remedying domestic abuse, but only temporarily address the
often-ongoing danger. Although injunctions regarding trademarks,
business matters, and financial interests are often permanent, civil
protection orders, which are a form of injunctive relief, are most
commonly only one year in duration.307
By imposing more stringent service requirements, the procedural
barriers to accessing legal protection shape and perpetuate intimate
partner violence, in contrast to the ready access that litigants in other areas
of the law have to the courts and legal remedies. Despite progress in the
creation of laws against violence, the legal system continues to perpetuate
status differences by giving diminished protection to domestic violence
survivors, most of whom are female.
C.

Race, Class, and Gender Identities of Domestic Violence
Petitioners

Aspects of identity are relevant to understanding the persistent
differential treatment of domestic violence remedies, including
heightened procedural requirements. Most petitioners in domestic
violence court are low-income women, with high percentages of
petitioners identifying as women of color,308 and states’ procedural rules
hold these litigants to rigid requirements that impede access to protection.
The heightened procedural requirements for protection from domestic
violence thus impose racial, gender, and class-based disadvantages on
communities the law has historically oppressed.

306. See Siegel, supra note 45, at 2119 (noting that the legal system plays an important role in
perpetuating status differences between husbands and wives).
307. Stoever, Enjoining Abuse, supra note 45, at 1015.
308. See Tricia B. Bent-Goodley, Culture and Domestic Violence, 20 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE
195, 196 (2005) (discussing the differential impact of domestic violence within groups of color); Lisa
Langenderfer-Magruder et al., Experiences of Intimate Partner Violence and Subsequent Police
Reporting Among Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer Adults in Colorado, 31 J.
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 855 (2016) (noting that LGBTQ individuals are at equal or higher risk of
intimate partner violence victimization as compared to heterosexual individuals, and transgender
individuals experience significantly higher rates of abuse than their cisgender peers); Beth Richie, A
Black Feminist Reflection on the Antiviolence Movement, 25 SIGNS 1133, 1136 (2000) (noting that
poor women of color are “most likely to be in both dangerous intimate relationships and dangerous
social positions”); Natalie J. Sokoloff & Ida Dupont, Domestic Violence at the Intersections of Race,
Class, and Gender, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 38 (2005) (discussing the need to give voice to
battered women from diverse backgrounds while focusing on remedying structural inequalities).
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Most protection order petitioners are women seeking protection from
abusive male partners, with demographic data from multiple jurisdictions
revealing that women are petitioners in approximately 85% to 92% of
civil protection order cases.309 These rates are consistent with significant
research showing that approximately 85% of domestic violence survivors
identify as female and 90% of abuse perpetrators identify as male.310
Research further shows that abuse endured by women is typically more
severe than abuse men experience,311 and that petitioners seek court
protection only after lengthy histories of abuse.312 Domestic violence is
understood to be about power and control dynamics and coercive control,
not solely gender, and experiences of abuse perpetuated by women against
men should not be discounted.313 Additionally, although lesbian, gay,
bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) individuals experience
intimate partner violence at the same or higher rates than individuals in
heterosexual relationships, legal protection and community-based


309. See Alesha Durfee, Victim Narratives, Legal Representation, and Domestic Violence Civil
Protection Orders, 4 FEMINIST CRIMINOLOGY 1, 16 (2009) (finding that 85% of petitioners are female
in a random sample of protection order petitions in an urban county); Susan B. Sorenson & Haikang
Shen, Restraining Orders in California: A Look at Statewide Data, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
912, 920 (2005) (examining over 200,000 domestic violence civil restraining order cases in California,
and finding that a man was to be restrained in 83.6% of cases); Katherine A. Vittes & Susan B.
Sorenson, Are Temporary Restraining Orders More Likely to Be Issued When Applications Mention
Firearms?, 30 EVALUATION REV. 266, 271 (2006) (analyzing Los Angeles County filings and finding
that 92.2% of petitioners were female, while 7.8% of petitioners were male).
310. Studies by the Department of Justice and the American Medical Association have shown that
80% of abuse is male to female, 10% is male to male, 6% is female to female, and 4% is female to
male. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. ET AL., COSTS OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 14 (2003) [hereinafter COSTS OF INTIMATE PARTNER
VIOLENCE]; see also TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 67, at 5 (discussing rates at which women are
abused).
311. See Lois Schwaeber, Recognizing Domestic Violence: How to Know It When You See It and
How to Provide Appropriate Representation, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, ABUSE, AND CHILD CUSTODY:
LEGAL STRATEGIES AND POLICY ISSUES 2–12 (Mo T. Hannah & Barry Goldstein eds., 2010)
(identifying that women experience higher levels of violence in intimate relationships in comparison
to men, including serious physical assault or being choked, drowned, or threatened with a gun); COSTS
OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, supra note 310, at 14 (discussing rates of physical violence).
312. Jane K. Stoever, Transforming Domestic Violence Representation, 101 KY. L.J. 483, 522
(2013) (describing the process abuse survivors undertake when seeking to leave an abusive
relationship or to end the violence in an ongoing relationship).
313. See Jamie R. Abrams, The Feminist Case for Acknowledging Women’s Acts of Violence, 27
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 101 (2016).
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services have typically had a hetero-normative approach and have not
been accessible to LGBTQ abuse survivors.314
Domestic violence petitioners are more commonly women of color
than represented in a region’s population. For example, in the District of
Columbia, over 85% of petitioners and respondents in civil protection
order cases in 2012 were African American, while 50% of the population
is African American.315 As an additional example, in a recent review of
Los Angeles County cases, 72% of petitioners identified as Latino, 20%
as African American, 4.5% as Caucasian, and 3.7% as Asian/Pacific
Islander; compared with the county’s ethnic composition, Latinos and
African Americans were significantly overrepresented as petitioners in
domestic violence cases.316 Other aspects of identity or health status can
further compound challenges to receiving court-ordered protection. For
example, women who are HIV-positive or at risk for HIV “face a fifty
percent chance of being a victim of domestic violence,”317 and individuals
experiencing domestic violence are at increased risk for HIV exposure. 318
Demographic statistics are striking in the context of historic lack of
outreach to and accessibility of services to racially and ethnically diverse
populations.319 Additional studies of protection order petitioners confirm
these demographic patterns over time,320 although these trends are shifting

314. See, e.g., Victoria Cruz, Domestic Violence Advocate/Counselor, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and
Transgender Communities and Intimate Partner Violence, Panel Discussion, in 29 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 121, 147 (2001) (describing the inability of many gay, lesbian, and transgender victims to access
domestic violence shelters).
315. SURVIVORS & ADVOCATES FOR EMPOWERMENT (DC SAFE), INC., supra note 17, at 7.
316. Vittes & Sorenson, supra note 309, at 271.
317. D.C. ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMM’N, JUSTICE FOR ALL? AN EXAMINATION OF THE CIVIL LEGAL
NEEDS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA’S LOW-INCOME COMMUNITY 61 (2008),
http://www.dcaccesstojustice.org/files/CivilLegalNeedsReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/TM33-NZG8];
D.C METRO. POLICE DEP’T, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND HIV, https://mpdc.dc.gov/sites/default/files/
dc/sites/mpdc/publication/attachments/DV_HIV.pdf [https://perma.cc/75UL-UZUD].
318. D.C. METRO. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 317.
319. Sherry Lipsky et al., The Role of Intimate Partner Violence, Race, and Ethnicity in HelpSeeking Behaviors, 11 J. ETHNICITY & HEALTH 81 (2006); Lisa M. Martinson, An Analysis of
Racism and Resources for African-American Female Victims of Domestic Violence in Wisconsin, 16
WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 259, 269–70 (2001) (describing exclusionary and discriminatory practices in
domestic violence shelters and services).
320. See OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF ADMIN. JUDGE FOR JUSTICE INITIATIVES, SELFREPRESENTED LITIGANTS: CHARACTERISTICS, NEEDS, SERVICES (2005), https://www.americanbar.
org/content/dam/aba/administrative/delivery_legal_services/downloads/nyselfrepresentedlitigants.a
uthcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/H5Q6-A8XR] (surveying over 3,300 self-represented litigants in
New York City Family Court and New York City Housing Court in 2003, and finding that 83% of
unrepresented litigants in these courts identified as African American, Asian, or Latino, with the
proportions of African American and Latino pro se litigants far outstripping their representation in
the general population); Sorenson & Shen, supra note 309, at 914, 922.
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during the Trump era.321 Following President Trump’s election and
expanded immigration enforcement efforts, dramatically fewer abuse
survivors with unsecure immigration status are seeking help from
domestic violence agencies or the civil or criminal justice systems.322
Axes of identity and oppression intersect, as poor Americans are
disproportionately women of color,323 and increased poverty correlates
with greater levels of domestic violence.324 Protection order petitioners
generally have scarce financial resources and struggle financially while
seeking protection from abuse.325 Nationwide, domestic violence is the
leading cause of homelessness for women and children,326 and over half
of women who attempt to leave abusive relationships fall below the
poverty line.327 Recent studies found that protection order petitioners in
Kentucky328 and battered immigrants329 generally have incomes of less
than $15,000. Poverty limits options, creates stressors and conditions that
promote abuse, and makes it more difficult to escape abuse.
Unsurprisingly, most domestic violence petitioners are unable to afford
counsel as they navigate the court system seeking protection.
Studies across areas of the law show that petitioners in domestic
violence protection order cases are the least likely to be represented by

321. James Queally, Fearing Deportation, Many Domestic Violence Victims Are Steering Clear of
Police and Courts, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-lnundocumented-crime-reporting-20171009-story.html [https://perma.cc/AUQ9-4J2G].
322. Id.
323. JOHN ICELAND, POVERTY IN AMERICA 81, 88 (2d ed. 2006).
324. Jody Raphael, Battering Through the Lens of Class, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L.
367, 367 (2003) (citing studies that document that household income predicts the level of violence in
a home); SHANNAN CATALANO, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE IN THE
UNITED STATES 16 (2007), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ipvus.pdf [https://perma.cc/V2MKHNAN] (examining nonfatal intimate partner victimization and finding that “females living in
households with lower annual incomes experienced the highest average annual rates”).
325. See Donna Coker, Shifting Power for Battered Women: Law, Material Resources, and Poor
Women of Color, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1009, 1019 (1999).
326. Sokoloff & Dupont, supra note 308, at 44.
327. Leslye Orloff, Lifesaving Welfare Safety Net Access for Battered Immigrant Women and
Children: Accomplishments and Next Steps, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 597, 617–18 (2001).
328. Lisa Shannon et al., Intimate Partner Violence, Relationship Status, and Protective Orders:
Does “Living in Sin” Entail a Different Experience?, 22 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1114, 1119
(2007) (58% of study participants had annual incomes of less than $15,000).
329. Nawal H. Ammar et al., Battered Immigrant Women in the United States and Protection
Orders: An Exploratory Research, 37 CRIM. JUST. REV. 337, 338 (2012) (finding that 67% of battered
immigrant women have yearly incomes of less than $15,000).
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counsel.330 For example, a recent study of the District of Columbia courts
found that approximately 98% of both petitioners and respondents in the
Domestic Violence Unit proceed pro se.331 Pro se litigation in complex
civil litigation, such as tort claims and commercial disputes, is extremely
rare, as is pro se litigant involvement in property rights claims.332 Data
from Washington State reveal pro se litigation in only 2-3% of complex
civil cases and in 19-20% of property rights cases.333 In stark contrast,
litigants are self-represented in 95% of domestic violence cases in
Washington State.334
Access-to-justice scholars have examined the correlation between
poverty and self-representation as they study court systems.335 Pro se
litigants typically report that they cannot afford an attorney, do not consult
with an attorney, have limited formal education, and are at a disadvantage
in pursuing legal claims.336 They often struggle to understand procedural
rules, become frustrated with the seeming impossibility of the legal
system, or are overwhelmed by the economic, logistical, and social toll of
cases.337 Much scholarship has focused on how pro se litigants are
disadvantaged in courtroom situations, how self-representation barriers
diminish pro se litigants’ confidence in the judicial system, what the
challenges are to judicial officers, and what additional resources courts
and litigants need.338
The experience of domestic violence amplifies the significant
challenges inherent in self-representation. Abuse survivors struggle with
the physical and psychological effects of violence and the trauma
provoked by coming to court, anticipating that they will recount histories

330. Anne D. Janku & Joseph A. Vradenburg, Self-Represented Litigants and Civil Case
Dispositions in Missouri: An Impact Analysis, 51 CT. REV. 74, 76 (2015); see also Steinberg, supra
note 38, at 749–51 (discussing increasing rates of pro se litigants in domestic violence cases).
331. D.C. ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMM’N, supra note 317, at 83.
332. JUDICIAL SERVS. DIV., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, AN ANALYSIS OF PRO SE LITIGANTS
IN
WASHINGTON STATE 1995–2000, at 2 (2001), https://www.courts.wa.gov/sub
site/wsccr/docs/Final%20Report_Pro_Se_11_01.pdf [https://perma.cc/649Q-P6YR].
333. Id. (examining Judicial Information System data and finding pro se litigant involvement in
20% of property rights issues in Washington State from 1995 to 2000).
334. Id. at 3 tbl.1.
335. See Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1788–90 (2001);
Steinberg, supra note 38, at 752–54.
336. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF ADMIN. JUDGE, supra note 320 (surveying over 3,300 selfrepresented litigants in New York City Family Court and New York City Housing Court in 2003).
337. Id.; see generally CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADMINS., POSITION PAPER ON SELFREPRESENTED LITIGATION (2000), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/de
livery_legal_services/downloads/positionpaper.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/4C6R-TG2W].
338. CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADMINS., supra note 337, at 1–4.
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of abuse and possibly encounter and be cross-examined by the abusive
partner.339 Pro se litigants are held to the same standards as those who are
represented by counsel, yet they commonly have difficulty properly
serving the opposing party and lack the resources and ability to do so.340
Not only do the procedural rules presume counsel who serves a vital role
in achieving service of process,341 they ignore domestic violence
dynamics and barriers to personally serving an abusive partner.
Petitioners who are unable to personally serve respondents struggle to
decide whether they can repeatedly return to court to seek continuances,
which often entails missing work, foregoing income, and having to make
daycare and transportation arrangements, in addition to being emotionally
taxing. Even with states increasingly enacting laws that prohibit
employers from firing domestic violence petitioners for missing work due
to court hearings,342 revealing personal information to utilize such laws
and losing wages present real hardships.
Access to safety and questions of procedural justice should be
evaluated in the context of the historic lack of protection against domestic
violence, the state’s historic oppression of women, and the racialized,
gendered, and class-based implications of imposing heightened notice
requirements. An interrelated part of the state’s differential legal treatment
of domestic violence survivors is its common distrust and disbelief of
abuse allegations, as explored in the next Section.
D.

Distrust of Domestic Violence Claims and Claimants

Jurisdictions enacted heightened procedural requirements for domestic
violence remedies in the context of historic “judicial and societal distrust

339. Tom Lininger, Bearing the Cross, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 101 (2005).
340. DONNA STIENSTRA ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., ASSISTANCE TO PRO SE LITIGANTS IN U.S.
DISTRICT COURTS: A REPORT ON SURVEYS OF CLERKS OF COURT AND CHIEF JUDGES 21–23 (2011),
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/ProSeUSDC.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q32T-N3WV]; Dan
Gustafson et al., Pro Se Litigation and the Costs of Access to Justice, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
32, 37 (2012).
341. Kleeman v. Rheingold, 81 N.Y.2d 270, 275 (Ct. App. 1993) (identifying counsel as being of
“central importance” to achieving service of process).
342. See Deborah A. Widiss, Domestic Violence and the Workplace: The Explosion of State
Legislation and the Need for a Comprehensive Strategy, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 669, 700 (2008); see,
e.g., Cal. Labor Code § 230(c) (2019) (prohibiting employers from discharging or discriminating or
retaliating against employees who take time off from work to seek domestic violence legal remedies
and to attend court hearings).
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of female complainants,”343 which persists to this day.344 Research shows
that fact finders disbelieve women solely because of their gender,
typically viewing women to be less credible than men and prone to
exaggerate claims, especially as related to gender-based violence and their
children.345 Professors Deborah Epstein and Lisa Goodman write about
how female abuse survivors routinely “face a Gaslight-style gauntlet of
doubt, disbelief, and outright dismissal of their stories.”346 A recent study
of gender stereotypes and credibility determinations found that both male
and female study participants viewed masculine victims as more credible
than feminine victims in scenarios with male defendants.347 Current
empirical research of custody cases involving allegations of domestic
violence and alienation348 also statistically confirms gender bias.
Professor Joan Meier and Sean Dickson conclude, “Overall, fathers who
were accused of abuse and who accused the mother of alienation won their
cases 72% of the time; slightly more than when they were not accused of
abuse (67%).”349 Furthermore, “When mothers alleged domestic violence,

343. Francine Banner, Honest Victim Scripting in the Twitterverse, 22 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN &
L. 495, 543 (2016); cf. Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REV. 741, 828 (2007)
(discussing reasons that many abuse victims distrust law enforcement and judges).
344. The nation was divided over Dr. Christine Blasey Ford’s allegations that now-Justice Brett
Kavanaugh sexually assaulted her, with some critiquing her for not coming forward sooner. See Lisa
Bonos, Trump Asks Why Christine Blasey Ford Didn’t Report Her Allegation Sooner. Survivors Answer
with
#WhyIDidntReport,
WASH.
POST
(Sept.
21,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/soloish/wp/2018/09/21/trump-asks-why-christine-blasey-forddidnt-report-her-allegation-sooner-survivors-answer-withwhyididntreport/?utm_term=.7b785e3ccda8
[https://perma.cc/4VP3-DXAH]; Monica Rhor, Brett Kavanaugh Supreme Court Confirmation Hearing
Shows Divide Between Men, Women, USA TODAY (Sept. 29, 2018, 2:35 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2018/09/28/brett-kavanaugh-christine-blasey-ford-assaultclaim-gender-divide/1459557002/ [https://perma.cc/4DAQ-KAPX].
345. WELLESLEY CTRS. FOR WOMEN, BATTERED MOTHERS SPEAK OUT: A HUMAN RIGHTS
REPORT ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND CHILD CUSTODY IN THE MASSACHUSETTS FAMILY COURTS 3
(2002) (reporting that fathers who seek custody are favored over mothers because “mothers are held
to a different and higher standard than fathers”); Dana H. Conner, Abuse and Discretion: Evaluating
Judicial Discretion in Custody Cases Involving Violence Against Women, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. 163, 176, 178 (2009).
346. Epstein & Goodman, Discounting Credibility, supra note 52.
347. Nesa E. Wasarhaley et al., The Impact of Gender Stereotypes on Legal Perceptions of Lesbian
Intimate Partner Violence, 32 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 635 (2017).
348. Parental alienation is a construct created by Richard Gardner, a child psychiatrist, “to describe
a ‘syndrome’ whereby vengeful mothers employed child abuse allegations in litigation as a powerful
weapon to punish ex-husbands and ensure custody to themselves.” Joan S. Meier & Sean Dickson,
Mapping Gender: Shedding Empirical Light on Family Courts’ Treatment of Cases Involving Abuse
and Alienation, 35 LAW & INEQ. 311, 316 (2017). The concept lacks “any scientific or empirical
foundation, and has today been largely—although by no means completely—rejected by experts and
scholars, and to a lesser degree, courts.” Id. at 317.
349. Id. at 328.
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fathers won 73% of the time . . . . Child sexual abuse allegations
increased fathers’ likelihood of winning to 81%.”350 This contemporary
research echoes the conclusions of multiple states’ Gender Bias Task
Forces: “Women receive unfavorable substantive outcomes in cases
because of their gender, and men do not. Women’s complaints are
trivialized and their circumstances misconstrued more often than men’s,
and women more often than men are victims of demeaning and openly
hostile behavior in court proceedings.”351
Domestic violence is trivialized by “all reaches of the justice system,
from police through prosecutors and judges,”352 and a woman’s character
is often attacked when she makes a complaint of abuse or sexual assault.353
Scholars and judicial-watch groups have tracked judicial hostility to
domestic violence remedies. Professor James Ptacek details judicial
responses that reinforce women’s entrapment in abusive relationships,
including minimizing, denying, and blaming the petitioner; neglecting the
survivor’s fears; exhibiting patronizing displays of authority, bias against
victim/survivors, and racist attitudes toward women of color; and making
hostile remarks toward domestic violence petitioners.354 An example of
judges enabling violent respondents includes being unwilling to impose
sanctions on respondents.355


350. Id. (emphasis in original).
351. Jeannette F. Swent, Gender Bias at the Heart of Justice: An Empirical Study of State Task
Forces, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 1, 55 (1996). A 2015 survey which yielded over 900
responses reported similar findings about police hostility, blame, and disbelief of abuse victims.
ACLU, CUNY SCHOOL OF LAW & UNIV. OF MIAMI SCHOOL OF LAW, RESPONSES FROM THE FIELD:
SEXUAL
ASSAULT,
DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE,
AND
POLICING
12
(2015),
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/2015.10.20_report_-_responses_from_the_
field.pdf [https://perma.cc/6DHA-LVX4].
352. Swent, supra note 351, at 55.
353. Banner, supra note 343, at 495 (describing how on social media sites, “terms such as ‘gold
digger,’ ‘slut,’ and ‘ho’ are engaged with regularity to describe those who come forward alleging an
assault by a public figure”); Karen Czapanskiy, Domestic Violence, the Family, and the Lawyering
Process: Lessons from Studies on Gender Bias in the Courts, 27 FAM. L. Q. 247, 254–55 n.19 (1993)
(identifying that female rape and domestic violence victims must often defend themselves against
accusations that they provoked the abusive act or are exaggerating the violence).
354. JAMES PTACEK, BATTERED WOMEN IN THE COURTROOM: THE POWER OF JUDICIAL
RESPONSES (1999), http://tcfv.org/pdf/Updated_wheels/Judical_responses%20that%20entrap.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B5BR-BET8] (depicting the Power and Control Wheel displaying judicial
responses that reinforce women’s entrapment).
355. Id.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3363973

392

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:333

Alongside the countless examples of judicial resistance or refusal to
enforce domestic violence laws,356 the state engages in racialized,
gendered, and class-based patterns of intervention in the family. This
includes the child welfare system’s targeting of African American and
Latino families with low incomes357 and heightened state scrutiny and
distrust of low-income women of color in the public benefits context.358
The state also often renders the rights of women irrelevant and their
decision-making capacity suspect regarding their reproductive health.359
In sum, race, class, gender, and victimization axes of identity make certain
individuals particularly vulnerable to state intrusion and control while the
state simultaneously fails to provide the help abuse survivors seek.360
The recent #MeToo movement is relevant to societal and legal
responses to gender-based violence. The movement reveals the persistent
societal reluctance to believe abuse survivors and offer real remedies,
seeks to create sustained social change, and draws on longstanding
feminist practices while also displaying some of the same privileging,
silencing, and infighting of the early battered women’s movement.361 The

356. Lynn H. Schafran, There’s No Accounting for Judges, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1063, 1065 (1995)
(“The reports of state supreme court task forces on gender bias in the courts are replete with reports
of judges who trivialize violence against women.” (citations omitted)).
357. Robin Fretwell Wilson, Removing Violent Parents from the Home: A Test Case for the Public
Health Approach, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 638, 658 (2005).
358. Wendy Bach, The Hyperregulatory State: Women, Race, Poverty, and Support, 25 YALE J.L.
& FEMINISM 317, 319–20 (2014); Khiara M. Bridges, Towards A Theory of State Visibility: Race,
Poverty, and Equal Protection, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 965, 968 (2010) (identifying how the
administration of public benefits and the information women must cede to the state is “premised on a
profound distrust of poor people and poor mothers”); Priscilla A. Ocen, The New Racially Restrictive
Covenant: Race, Welfare, and the Policing of Black Women in Subsidized Housing, 59 UCLA L. REV.
1540 (2012).
359. See Joanne E. Brosh & Monica K. Miller, Regulating Pregnancy Behaviors: How the
Constitutional Rights of Minority Women Are Disproportionately Compromised, 16 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 437, 438–39 (2008); Ruth Colker, Blaming Mothers: A Disability
Perspective, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1205, 1206 (2015) (identifying the state’s distrust of women’s decisionmaking throughout pregnancy and motherhood); Michele Goodwin, Prosecuting the Womb, 76 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1657 (2008); Dorothy E. Roberts, Privatization and Punishment in the New Age of
Reprogenetics, 54 EMORY L.J. 1343, 1346 (2005) (describing the “rush to punish poor, substanceabusing mothers for their reproductive failures”); Ruthann Robson, Lesbians and Abortion, 35 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 247, 277 (2011) (identifying that “an interrogation of a woman’s ‘reason’
for having an abortion demonstrates a distrust of women similar to the distrust apparent in other
abortion restrictions that treat women [who] have abortions quite differently than ungendered patients
providing informed consent for other medical procedures”).
360. See generally Stoever, Mirandizing Family Justice, supra note 119 (analyzing state services
that replicate control and deny survivors autonomy); Stoever, Parental Abduction, supra note 65
(identifying the state’s hyper-aggressive interventions in some contexts, often against victims’ wishes,
while failing to criminally or civilly respond to other areas for which survivors seek help).
361. See Jane K. Stoever, Introduction, in THE POLITICIZATION OF SAFETY (Jane K. Stoever ed.,
forthcoming 2019); Caroline Kitchener, Larry Nassar and the Impulse to Doubt Female Pain,
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#MeToo movement and news reports initially focused on Hollywood,
politicians, and those in the public eye, with multiple complaints against
Harvey Weinstein, Matt Lauer, Charlie Rose, Al Franken, Kevin Spacey,
Louis CK, Mario Batali, and dozens of other high-profile individuals.362
It appeared that multiple women publicly had to allege abuse or
harassment for any single survivor’s allegation to be believed, and all too
often, workplaces, schools, churches, and other institutions of trust had
longstanding knowledge of pernicious abuse, as was the case with
Dr. Larry Nassar’s sexual abuse of over 100 girls and women.363 Similar
to the limited focus on the plight of domestic violence litigants, the
#MeToo movement initially lacked any focus on less glamorous
workplaces and professions. In further developing domestic violence
remedies and responses, this Article explores how overly onerous service
of process requirements compound the challenges abuse survivors face in
legal systems that have not been responsive to their complaints and how
such rules create barriers to safety and justice, necessitating reform.
V.

LAW REFORM TO INCREASE ACCESS TO SAFETY AND
JUSTICE

Efforts to remedy gender-based violence must include making legal
remedies accessible. Courts currently dismiss volumes of protection order
cases daily for lack of personal service, leaving abuse survivors without
needed protection. Jurisdictions should instead reform procedural rules to
address historic injustices and provide actual access to domestic violence
remedies.
Due to the safety and logistical difficulties in accomplishing personal
service in a significant volume of domestic violence cases, this Article
recommends that all states adopt provisions automatically permitting
alternative service after two hearing dates at which personal service is not
achieved. This Article further recommends that court rules enable
petitioners to request alternative means, such as electronic service, from

ATLANTIC (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2018/01/larry-nassar-and-theimpulse-to-doubt-female-pain/551198/ [https://perma.cc/8LLT-KAHY]; supra notes 47–53 and
accompanying text.
362. Supra note 48–49 and accompanying text.
363. See Kitchener, supra note 361; Dan Barry et al., Molested as FBI Case Plodded for a Year,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/03/sports/nassar-fbi.html
[https://perma.cc/W4BA-YHHQ] (reporting that at least forty girls and women were molested by
Dr. Nassar after he was under federal investigation).
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the outset upon filing domestic violence cases in situations in which the
respondent’s home, employment address, and whereabouts are unknown.
The challenges regarding service are so common that three states,
Minnesota, Nevada, and Washington, have enacted an automatic means
of permitting alternative service methods after initial attempts at personal
service fail.364 Additional concrete reforms identified in Sections V.A and
V.B are also essential in order to increase access to the protection order
remedy.
A.

Abrogate Procedural Laws Preventing Access to Protection Orders

Current rules requiring notice before seeking temporary protection
from abuse, mandating case dismissal for failure to perfect personal
service, and requiring that personal service be accomplished multiple days
prior to the hearing date for it to be valid prevent access to safety and
justice for abuse survivors.
1.

Address Pre-Temporary Protection Order Notice Rules

Some jurisdictions require a domestic violence survivor to notify the
abusive partner before the petitioner seeks a temporary emergency
protection order. For example, eleven California counties require the
petitioner to contact the respondent by phone or in person and provide
notice four to twenty-four hours prior to filing for a temporary civil
protection order.365 These rules are highly dangerous and contrary to the
national standard, which permits courts to grant TPOs without notice if
the respondent poses a present risk of abuse.366
Given the heightened rates of abuse and lethal violence at separation,
the risk of revealing confidential locations, and the short-term nature of
TPOs which can be vacated, jurisdictions should abrogate laws that
require that the petitioner give notice prior to seeking emergency
temporary protection.
2.

Prevent Dismissal for Failure to Serve

Some jurisdictions’ court rules require courts to dismiss cases when the
petitioner has failed to personally serve the respondent by the first,

364. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01 (2018); NEV. REV. STAT. § 33.030 (2018).
365. California counties requiring pre-TPO notice include Alameda, Alpine, Amador, Butte,
Humboldt, Imperial, Inyo, Kern, Lake, Lassen, and Los Angeles. See, e.g., ORANGE CTY. R. 704(1)
(four-hour notice); SIERRA CTY. R. 6.14(a) (notice by 10:00 a.m. the prior day).
366. See supra notes 142–145.
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second, or third hearing date.367 Many of these petitioners would be
legally entitled to relief if they were able to have an evidentiary hearing
on the merits, and rules mandating dismissal directly contravene the
petitioner’s due process right to a hearing.368 Mandatory dismissal rules
also leave abuse survivors without needed protection that can prevent
respondents from coming to their homes, workplaces, and schools;
prohibit respondents from taking their children from daycare or school;
and provide additional safety-related protection.
When states do not specify the number of times a petitioner may return
to court if personal service is not effectuated,369 some judges as a matter
of practice dismiss domestic violence petitions for lack of service after
only one or two attempts, informing petitioners that the dismissal is
“without prejudice” and they may re-file once the respondent reappears.370
The routine dismissal of cases for lack of personal service fails to protect
individuals being stalked or still abused, but whose intimate partners
successfully evade service. Instead, service rules should be reformed to
make service of process more effective,371 and should prevent the
dismissal of cases before a hearing on the merits.
Additionally, respondents may not have stable home or work addresses,
yet may still be in contact through telephone, text message, and social
media and know the petitioner’s whereabouts. The nationwide
requirement that parties cannot serve process themselves and must instead
do so through a third party to ensure validity of service372 presents further
barriers to achieving service. Unfortunately, all too often the petitioner
has the unique opportunity to serve the respondent when the respondent
unexpectedly appears at the petitioner’s home. An exception to the
general rule against a litigant personally serving the opposing party should
be made for such situations. Personal service requirements are challenging

367. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
368. See supra Section III.A.
369. Rebecca Griego Bill Passes Senate Unanimously, supra note 16 (“Currently, protection orders
must be served on the abuser in person, and there are no clearly defined limits to how many times a
victim must return to court if the authorities are not able to locate and serve the abuser.”).
370. Minute Orders providing examples are on file with the Author. The Author has also heard this
statement from multiple judges.
371. See infra Section V.B.
372. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 414.10 (West 2018) (“A summons may be served by any
person who is at least 18 years of age and not a party to the action.”); TEX. R. CIV. P. 103 (“[N]o
person who is a party to or interested in the outcome of a suit may serve any process in that suit.”).
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for both petitioners and law enforcement,373 as reflected in the high rates
of case continuances and dismissals for lack of service.374
3.

Nullify Time Limits

Many states require that service occur a set number of days prior to the
hearing, with five days being common across states.375 This means that a
litigant could achieve personal service closer to the hearing, but the court
would not consider the service valid, the merit hearing could not occur,
and the respondent would be alerted to evade service.
Any personal service should be considered effective, particularly
considering the compressed timeframe of two to three weeks from the
filing date to the hearing date. Instead of imposing a multi-day period prior
to the hearing by which service must be effectuated, respondents can be
given a continuance to permit time to gather evidence and prepare their
cases. Alongside the current five-day notice provision in California, for
example, respondents are already guaranteed the right to at least one
continuance.376
B.

Reform Service Rules for Domestic Violence Cases

1.

Law Enforcement Service Attempts Pursuant to VAWA Should
Provide Prima Facie Proof of Diligent Effort

Under VAWA,377 as a condition of receiving federal funds, states must
certify that petitioners are not charged fees for serving domestic violence
protection order or restraining order cases378 To comply with federal law,
all states have adopted laws requiring state and local sheriff and police
departments to effect service of process in domestic violence cases.379 For

373. Police will not typically serve process at homeless shelters, which is a practice intended to
encourage unhoused individuals to find shelter and safety without fearing police encounters. This was
my experience as a live-in staff member at a homeless shelter.
374. Supra notes 14–18 and accompanying text.
375. CAL. FAM. CODE § 243 (West 2018) (requiring that service be perfected at least five days prior
to the hearing); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-02(3) (2017) (requiring personal service upon the
respondent at least five days prior to the hearing); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.50.050 (2018) (requiring
personal service on the respondent at least five days prior to the hearing).
376. CAL. FAM. CODE § 245(a).
377. Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54 (codified in part in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
378. 42 U.S.C. § 3796hh(c)(1)(D) (2018).
379. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30(2)(a) (West 2018) (specifying a mechanism through
which the state court pays law enforcement officers a fee for service in each domestic violence case);
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-202(a) (West 2018) (“Process shall be served by a sheriff.”).
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example, New Jersey orders court clerks to immediately forward all
domestic violence petitions and temporary orders to law enforcement for
service and mandates that the documents “shall immediately be
served.”380 Given federal and state law, police and sheriff departments
should allocate sufficient resources to this important task. If law
enforcement is unable to effectuate service by the second court date, this
should serve as prima facie proof of “diligent effort” permitting
alternative service.
States should enact presumptions that if law enforcement has not been
able to accomplish personal service by the second hearing date, the
petitioner is automatically permitted to utilize an alternative means most
likely to achieve actual notice. In some jurisdictions, alternative service is
not available for domestic violence remedies, furthering historic lack of
protection from abuse; in other jurisdictions, access to alternative methods
of service is prohibitively difficult. For example, to receive permission to
utilize alternative service in Pennsylvania, a litigant must show proof of
“(1) inquiries of postal authorities including inquiries pursuant to the
Freedom of Information Act, (2) inquiries of relatives, neighbors, friends,
and employers of the defendant, (3) examinations of local telephone
directories, courthouse records, voter registration records, local tax
records, and motor vehicle records, and (4) a reasonable internet
search.”381 It is also challenging for pro se litigants to separately motion
the court for alternative service.
Placing service obligations with law enforcement as mandated by
federal law and having a ready structure in place for alternative service
ensures the petitioner’s right to a hearing on the merits, permits methods
of service still likely to notify the respondent of the case, and makes
alternative service methods procedurally accessible. This proposition
relieves petitioners of the obligations of traditional methods for requesting
alternative service that require specialized legal knowledge, motions to
the court, and additional court dates and which present access barriers to
unrepresented petitioners.
Three states have already adopted laws that automatically permit
service alternatives in the domestic violence context, which helpfully
provide predictability and save judicial resources. Minnesota allows the

380. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-28 (West 2018) (requiring clerks to immediately forward domestic
violence complaints and emergency orders to law enforcement for service and mandating that the
documents “shall immediately be served”).
381. PA. R. CIV. P. 430.
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petitioner’s failed efforts at personal service to be followed by one week
of published notice and requires the petitioner to mail service to the
respondent’s last known residence.382 Unlike in most other states, an
additional motion or judicial permission is not required.383 Pursuant to the
Rebecca Griego Act,384 courts in Washington now cannot require more
than two attempts at obtaining personal service, and they must then permit
service by mail or publication.385 In Nevada, law enforcement agencies
are required to personally serve respondents,386 but if the respondent’s
home address is unknown or law enforcement has had at least two failed
service attempts to the respondent’s place of employment, the law
automatically permits service by mail to the workplace.387 The Nevada
solution is limited in that it is only effective when the respondent is
employed and the petitioner is aware of such employment. The
recommendations in the following section present more expansive
options.
2.

Electronic Service for Modern Life

Procedural rules concerning service and applied to domestic violence
matters should continue to evolve to respond to technological advances
and how people function and communicate. Some traditional methods of
alternative service, namely service via publication in a newspaper or by
posting a summons at a set location in a courthouse, rarely achieve actual
notice, which judges and scholars acknowledge.388 In contrast, service via
mail to a known residential or employment address is more likely to
communicate notice to the respondent. The most effective way for giving
timely notice to an individual would often be electronic service, but it is
not currently permitted as a primary service means for domestic violence
cases in any jurisdiction. In fact, only three jurisdictions explicitly permit
electronic service as an alternative form of service for protection orders.389

382. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01 (2018).
383. Id.; cf., e.g., ALA. R. CIV. P. 4.3(d)(1); D.C. DOM. VIOL. R. 5(a)(3)(A)(i); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:25-28; N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 826 (McKinney 2015).
384. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.50.050 (2018).
385. Id.
386. NEV. REV. STAT. § 33.030 (2018).
387. Id.
388. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 727 (1877) (identifying that publishing process “in the
great majority of cases, would never be seen by the parties interested”); Melodie M. Dan, Social
Networking Sites: A Reasonably Calculated Method to Effect Service of Process, 1 CASE W. RES. J.L.
TECH. & INTERNET 183, 207 (2010) (noting that service by publication is unlikely to provide actual
notice and should be used as a last resort).
389. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 4(e); D.C. DOM. VIOL. R. 5(c); ME. R. CIV. P. 4(g).
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Unlike checking the newspaper daily to see if one’s name appears
regarding a court proceeding, the average person in the United States
checks his or her cellular phone eighty-six times per day.390 Today,
individuals across socioeconomic statuses commonly have cellular
phones. A 2018 Pew Research Center study found that 95% of Americans
have some type of cellular phone, with 100% of people age eighteen to
twenty-nine possessing a cellular phone and 98% of Americans age thirty
to forty-nine owning phones.391 The high ownership rates are significant
and these age brackets largely match the age demographics of protection
order litigants. The 2018 Pew study further found that over three-quarters
of Americans have smartphones, and young adults, non-whites, and
lower-income Americans particularly rely on smartphones for online
access.392
Under current personal service requirements, respondents commonly
refuse to open the door to accept service or can otherwise evade service
or be extremely difficult to locate by a third party. Even if the petitioner
or a third party texts, emails, or mails the petition and summons to the
respondent, rules that require hand-delivery make actual notice
insufficient. The constitutional standard simply requires that service be
“reasonably calculated” to deliver notice to the opposing party. If personal
service is not readily achievable, a petitioner should be permitted to have
someone notify the respondent via text message, email, or social media
message functions about the protection order hearing date, choosing an
electronic method through which the petitioner and respondent have
previously or regularly communicated. The server could, for example,
send via text message images of the petition, summons, and any TPO or
ask the respondent to check his or her email for the petition, summons,
and temporary order. Current technology, such as “read receipts” that alert
the sender when his or her message has been read, could be offered to the

390. Lisa Eadicicco, Americans Check Their Phones Eight Billion Times a Day, TIME (Dec. 15,
2015),
http://time.com/4147614/smartphone-usage-us-2015/
[https://perma.cc/4XSL-4AHK]
(reporting on a study finding that individuals ages eighteen to twenty-four view their phones an
average of seventy-four times per day, those who are age twenty-five to thirty-four check their phones
fifty times per day, and people who are age thirty-five to forty-four look at their phones thirty-five
times per day); see also Chris Fullwood et al., My Virtual Friend: A Qualitative Analysis of the
Attitudes and Experiences of Smartphone Users: Implications for Smartphone Attachment, 75
COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAV. 347 (2017) (discussing “habitual” use of mobile phones).
391. PEW RESEARCH CTR., MOBILE FACT SHEET (Feb. 5, 2018), http://www.pewinternet.org/factsheet/mobile/ [https://perma.cc/D63S-YBJL].
392. Id.
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court, assuming the cellular phone user has not deactivated this
function.393
A respondent often continues to contact a petitioner directly through
text or social media messages, yet under current rules the petitioner’s
response to the respondent providing notice of the case and images of the
petition and summons is insufficient for notice. Currently, even when the
respondent acknowledges the protection order case through text message,
email, or social media responses and posts, the respondent’s actual notice
paradoxically does not satisfy the personal service requirement. Service
rules can adapt to realities of life and technology such that a petitioner’s
text message, email, or social media message notifying the respondent of
the case could suffice. In proving notice by a third party or the petitioner,
the petitioner can also provide copies of emails or screenshots of text
messages or social media communications to the court as proof of service.
The petitioner can also show the court proof that the respondent has
recently used the phone number, email address, or social media messaging
function through their communications history or through read receipts.
Presuming law enforcement attempts at service fulfill “diligent effort”
requirements and automatically permitting alternative service methods,
including electronic service, will remedy current procedural barriers.
CONCLUSION
Access to safety and justice for abuse survivors can only be achieved
when abused individuals are able to access court protection, as legislatures
intended. This Article seeks to achieve the legislative purpose of civil
protection orders by actually making this valuable legal remedy available
to abuse survivors who petition courts for help.
The law has not historically afforded protection to low-income women
of color, who disproportionately are the petitioners in protection order
cases. Current stringent procedural barriers work to impede access to this
legislative remedy to domestic abuse and, troublingly, result in the
dismissal of high percentages of cases. Expanding service options to
address procedural justice and access to courts will help address historic
and contemporary differential treatment of domestic violence remedies
while protecting all parties’ due process rights.


393. See Sarah Silbert, How to Tell When Someone Reads Your Text Message, LIFEWIRE (Feb. 2,
2019), https://www.lifewire.com/read-my-text-message-4148206 [https://perma.cc/2JVW-CT9T].
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